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African initiatives for dealing 
with conflict 
Africa continues to have more conflicts than any other region in the 
world, and individual governments do not always have the capacity to 
solve them when they arise. Such conflicts take a toll on the population, 
and are a major cause of poverty and barrier to development. 
In many parts of the continent, foreign troops are involved in peace 
operations; for instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), in Sierra Leone, in Liberia. Furthermore, private security forces 
have stepped into the breech in many cases, particularly where the 
state is weak. 
Nevertheless, there are heartening examples of peace restoration 
initiatives, conflict management and resolution, where African 
leadership has been the decisive ingredient, such as in Burundi, 
Sudan, DRC, Cote d'Ivoire, and Somalia. African peacekeeping 
forces are also serving throughout the continent. 
At the recent African Union (AU) Heads of State summit in Maputo, 
peace and security issues were high on the agenda. The AU's 
predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was sworn to 
non-interference in the internal affairs of nations. However, the AU's 
Constitutive Act says there are instances in which the AU must act. 
Indeed, the second pillar of the AU refers to "the promotion of 
peace, security and stability on the continent" (the other two pillars 
are partnership with civil society and socio-economic integration). 
Institutional capacity-building for peace is vital, and the AU has 
taken significant steps towards creating credible mechanisms for 
conflict resolution and arbitration. A Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) is being established and work is underway to get the necessary 
majority of countries to ratify the body's protocols. The PSC should 
have legal power to intervene in member states' domestic affairs in 
cases of violations of human rights or where the principles of good 
governance are flouted. 
Africa's peace and security prospects were also given a considerable 
boost with the resolution in Maputo on a Peace Support Operation 
Facility, which called for an EU-financed instrument for long-term 
and reliable support for African-owned initiatives in conflict 
prevention and peacekeeping (see articles on pages 4 and 6). With 
conflicts and law and order breakdowns now recurring in the Pacific 
(i.e. the Solomon Islands), other ACP regions may consider whether 
such a Facility could be a useful instrument for them also. Contents 
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Population, poverty and choice: 
an interview with the head of the UN Population Fund, 
Thoraya Obaid 
Nine years ago the 1994 International Conference on Population and 
Development in Cairo agreed that slowing population growth could not be 
separated from economic growth, human rights and the reduction of poverty in 
the world's developing countries. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA
1) has been 
central to implementing the conference's proposals since then. During her 
recent visit to Brussels we talked to Thoraya Obaid about its work and asked 
her first to explain the link between population and poverty. 
François Lefèbvre 
There are two levels. There is the 
macro, national level, where, if the num-
ber of people increases, the ability of the 
national government to provide services, 
education, employment, and so on, 
becomes harder. There is also the link 
between population and environment: 
the larger the population, the more it 
depends on the natural resources; there is 
a degradation of natural resources, and so 
poverty becomes cyclical. 
Also at the macro level, it's the poorest 
who tend to have more children, because 
of lack of education, lack of health serv-
ices including reproductive health. So 
the impact of population growth is even harder on the 
poorest and that also creates a cycle of poverty. 
On the individual level, the micro, family level, you have 
the problem of the ability of parents to provide education 
for all their children. The larger the family, the harder it is 
to provide c]uality care. If you are already in a poor country, 
where the national systems are weak and there are no 
employment opportunities, it becomes a cycle of poverty. 
What has been achieved in the decade since the 
Cairo conference? 
We always say that population is a success story, so far. The 
trend for the past 4() to 50 years has been towards lower pop-
ulation growth globally. But according to the projections, 
between now and 2050 population growth could increase 
from six billion to eight or nine billion, depending on the sce-
nario. And most of this growth will happen in poor countries, 
where the systems are already weak and cannot absorb it. 
Globally, it is a success story but we still need to take care of 
the poor countries where population growth is at a high level. 
What are the most effective means of slowing 
demographic growth? 
The main emphasis is on quality of life, because popula-
tion growth is a by-product. Ifall couples can have access to 
reproductive health services, they will be able to have fewer 
children and the by-product will be lower population 
growth. But the main emphasis, for the UNFPA, is on the 
ability of women to choose the number and the spacing of 
their children as a right, and the universal 
access of women and men to reproductive 
health services. If you guarantee that 
right, the by-product is a slowdown in 
population growth. 
What is the UNFPA doing to 
address the reproductive health 
needs of women, especially in 
sub-Saharan African countries? 
One woman dies per minute from birth 
or pregnancy-related problems. One of 
our targets is a decrease in maternal mor-
tality, because, by doing so, not only the 
women but also the children will live. 
This means ensuring that women have care throughout their 
lives, especially pre-natal, post-natal and later. This also 
means ensuring that there are birth attendants, because in 
many of the developing countries, women do not give birth 
in a medical or even paramedical setting. 
In sub-Saharan Africa in particular, we focus on maternal 
mortality, on HIV/AIDS prevention - that's a very big issue. 
Furthermore, one of the major issues that impacts on repro-
ductive health and the ability of women to be able to make 
choices, is violence against them. 
The programme basically focuses on reproductive health, 
adolescent reproductive health, decreasing maternal mortality 
and insuring that there are commodities. You can't promote the 
concept of women being able to make choices (the number and 
spacing of their children) if the services are not available. You're 
building expectation without being able to deliver anything. 
The issue of commodities is also very critical in the pre-
vention of HIV/AIDS, to be able to prevent it through the 
three methods: abstinence, "be faithful" and condoms (ABC). 
Two years ago there was an estimate that in Africa, if the exist-
ing supply condoms were evenly distributed, three condoms 
would be available per man per year. You can't prevent 
HIV/AIDS that way. 
Isn't education the key element in improving the 
standard of living of women? 
Education is part of it, but not all. There is a correlation 
between education and the number of children women 
have; so they don't get married at 12 or 13, have children 
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by the age of 14, and so on. Linked to 
education you need other elements of 
support. Education alone will not 
change things. It will give them aware-
ness, but they will be very frustrated if 
they have the awareness but not the 
means. 
How does the UNFPA address 
religious and cultural beliefs or 
practices when it is developing 
programmes and projects? 
This is an area I'm very interested in. 
Some UNFPA programmes have used 
religion or cultural values as an entry 
point to deal with the problems, but it 
was never systemised, but project by 
project, and now we're looking at it as a 
system. We have succeeded in the past in 
mobilising religious leaders; for example, 
in Senegal, the Christian and Muslim 
clergy were involved in discussions about 
female genital mutilation. Senegal 
passed laws on the subject, a lot due to the fact that the reli-
gious leaders were able to mobilise the people. 
Religious organisations provide about fifty per cent of 
social services, and they are at the community level. People 
respect them and listen to them. We try to find a way to 
work with them where we respect each other's borders. For 
example, in Nairobi I had a long discussion with the 
Archbishop of Kenya. We have a joint programme with 
them on HIV/AIDS and basically the agreement is that 
through the church where the young people go, they are 
provided with full information about HIV/AIDS and the 
three methods of prevention. 
But the church cannot promote condoms. They counsel 
about abstinence and so on. Young people who do not want to 
go the abstinence route are referred to the government services 
or to an NGO that can provide other counselling and services 
for them. This is what I mean by respecting others' views. 
Naturally, we are facing problems with the extreme inter-
pretations of some religions, and we are trying to dialogue as 
much as possible with the more liberal or open areas. But cer-
tainly if we did not open channels of communication with 
those who are on the ground and doing good work, we would 
lose fifty per cent of the services that are already available. 
And, what about China? 
The issue in China is to demonstrate to the Chinese govern-
ment that, in the 32 counties where we work, when people can 
have access to quality reproductive health services, when thev 
can get good counselling and are not forced to use only one 
method - like abortion - and when they have many different 
commodities, they can make a choice. In the 32 counties, we 
also have figures showing that abortion has gone down. The 
Chinese have now decided to expand this model into the 880 
counties. So it is a success story and we have made a difference. 
The other reason for our presence is the fact that il you are-
nor there to have a dialogue with the government and to keep 
on pushing the agenda of individual human rights, who's going 
to do it? But the US considers that just by being there we arc 
promoting coercive population policies. All the investigations, 
including the one the US President sent - a three-member team 
that spoke Chinese and was not chaperoned by the Chinese 
-said there was no evidence that UNFPA was participating in 
the management of coercive population policies. Bur in spite of 
that the President chose not to give the funds allocated to us. 
Even so we are continuing to work there and beginning a new 
programme with the Chinese. And we're hoping to expand the 
human rights aspect of reproductive health even further. 
What has been the impact of the US decision to 
cancel its voluntary annual contribution to the 
UNFPA? 
Last year Congress allocated $34 million to the UNFPA 
and President Bush did not give it to us. The sad part of it is 
that you cannot begin a programme, then stop it and then go 
back and say: "Okay, now we can continue". So we try to tell 
our partners: "You're getting the minimum, so we won't 
stop". But this means you're not expanding new pro-
grammes, you're not opening new areas. For example, in 
some areas we're not able to provide contraceptives or to col-
lect data and do health surveys on quality of life and health 
problems. In our work, a little money goes a long way. When 
we cannot give a country some ofthat money, it makes a big 
difference in their lives. But we try not to create a panic. 
What is the Cairo consensus on abortion? 
Ine Cairo consensus says the following: "Abortion is not 
a form of family planning". It calls on governments to 
expand reproductive health services (prenatal, post-natal, 
maternal and so on) in order to decrease the possibilities of 
abortion. It calls on governments to insure that their health 
systems are able to cope with complications from unsafe 
abortions. And, finally, abortion is subject to national laws. 
So it's a national issue that each country has to decide on its 
own. Our mandate is very clear, we do not deal with abor-
tion; we do not promote it nor do we provide it or assist in 
providing it, but we do work with governments to train 
people to deal with the consequences of unsafe abortion. ■ 
I.Thc UNFPA was founded in 1969 as die UN Fund ii>r Population Activities, hi I9H7 its 
name was changed to the I IN Population Fund hut ii retained ils original acronym. 
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African Union (AU) summit in Maputo 
Peace and stability dominate the agenda 
A significant number of Africa countries are today torn by conflict. Therefore, the 
issue of maintaining peace and stability on the continent was high on the agenda of 
the second summit of the African Union (UA). Meeting in the Mozambican capital 
from 10 to 12 July, African Heads of State endeavoured to advance the Peace and 
Security Council and the African intervention Force. Two ambitious projects, which 
will be able to see the light of day only with strong political will on the part of the 
Africans and the support of their international partners. 
Jordane Bertrand 
A half-dozen Chairs remained empty during the sum-
mit: leaders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania, the most volatile coun-
tries, stayed away. Another absent figure was François 
Bozize, the self-proclaimed president of the Central African 
Republic, who came to power through a coup in March 
2003: he was not invited by the AU, which remained firm 
on the principle adopted in Algiers in 1999 condemning all 
non-constitutional taking of power. The Liberian president 
Charles Taylor, under the shadow of an international war-
rant for his arrest for war crimes committed in his country, 
did not leave Monrovia. 
These absences reflect the chronic instability of the 
African continent and provoked the heads of state to react 
at the Maputo meeting. Aware of the disastrous effects of 
conflicts on development projects, they committed firmly 
to working for peace. Mozambican president Joaquim 
Chissano, whose country will hold the presidency of the 
African Union for one year, was optimistic. "Consensus has 
been reached that peace and security are basic conditions 
for ensuring harmonious and sustainable development in 
Alpha Oumar Konare, former president of Mali, was elected to head the AU 
Commission, which oversees the day-to-day running of the organisation. 
Africa". For supporters of the new Partnership for 
Development, NEPAD, presented as an overall develop-
ment programme, it is obvious that continuing conflict will 
inhibit foreign investors and the economic takeoff of the 
continent. The heads of state were not satisfied to simply 
study the crises on a case-by-case basis. As well as the 
announcement made in the margins of the summit on 
sending ECOWAS (Economic Community of West 
African States) troops to Liberia, the innovation here was 
the setting up of permanent mechanisms for conflict pre-
vention and management. 
The Peace and Security Council 
After the Durban summit in 2002 which had officially rat-
ified the transformation of the Organisation for African 
Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), the Maputo 
summit was charged with setting up the institutions of the 
new organisation. While the pan-African Parliament, the 
African Court of Justice, and the African Central Bank will 
have to wait, the Peace and Security Council is the most 
advanced of the institutions. Seventeen countries have 
already ratified the text; twenty-seven are needed for the 
Council to be created. From the very opening of the summit, 
South African president Thabo Mbeki urged his fellow heads 
of state "to do everything in their power so that the Peace and 
Security Council can be operational before the end of 2003". 
Based on the model of the United Nations Security 
Council, this new body will have fifteen members elected 
in rotation, who will vote for resolutions and to send troops 
on the ground. A notable characteristic is that five person-
alities of the continent, apolitical but recognised for their 
moral authority, will form a Council of Wise Men, to direct 
the decisions. 
"From a first-generation mechanism within the OAU, we 
passed directly to a third-generation mechanism, which 
goes much further. The fifteen members will be elected on 
well-defined criteria, and not in the almost automatic way 
which was the case up to now. The mandate will be more 
important, making it possible to send observation and 
peace maintenance forces on the ground, and, if necessary, 
intervention forces," indicated Said Djinnit, Algerian 
ambassador, re-elected during the Maputo Summit as head 
of the Commission on Peace and Security. He says that the 
project is fundamentally new for Africa and symbolic of the 
new African Union. 
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Logically, discussions also covered putting in place an 
African intervention force, which would serve as the mili-
tary arm of the Peace and Security Council. Consensus was 
not reached on the form that this pan-African military force 
would take. Some countries, including Libya, favour a per-
manent continental force. The majority of the other sub-
Saharan Africa countries, including South Africa, are in 
favour of regional forces consisting of national quotas, 
mobilised as emergencies arise. The heads of state finally 
opted to continue discussions during an extraordinary sum-
mit to be held in Syrte (Libya) in the coming months. The 
Syrte summit will be preceded by regional meetings during 
which defence ministers will submit reports on the capaci-
ties of their country to take part in the force. 
The Durban spirit 
African initiatives to resolve the problems of Africa: the 
Peace and Security Council should reflect the new philosophy 
of the AU, which was launched in Durban in 2002.Similarly, 
NEPAD, which is to be incorporated into the structures of the 
AU in three years' time, favours economic development cho-
sen by the countries themselves. The AU has created mecha-
nisms to guarantee better governance on the continent. The 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), an instrument vol-
untarily acceded to by AU members, envisages assessments on 
a country basis on economic and political governance issues. 
Corruption, human rights, business ethics; as many areas as 
the applicant countries will agree to have appraised within their 
institutions. Sixteen countries have so far adopted this conti-
nent-owned evaluation system. The first volunteer is Ghana, 
which is expected to be subjected to the APRM before the end 
of 2003. A group of six "eminent" persons, including the 
Mozambican Graça Machet and the Senegalese Marie-Angelica 
Savané, will be responsible for overseeing the evaluations. 
The election of former Malian president Alpha Oumar 
Konare to head the Commission of the African Union, fol-
lowing the withdrawal of the Côte D'Ivoire candidate 
Amara Essy, is seen as a strong signal. The bigger countries 
of the continent in particular wished to raise the profile of 
the executive, which has the formidable task of completing 
the setting up of the institutions. During his speech at the 
close of the summit, Mr Konare urged Africans to make a 
"permanent reference to their culture" in order to "to build 
the Africa of our dreams" and ensure that the rule of law 
and democracy had their proper place. Further evidence of 
this innovative spirit was the adoption of the principle of an 
equal number of male and female commissioners and the 
signature of a very innovative protocol on women's rights. 
The boldness of the AU projects is matched unfortu-
nately by meagre finances. More than two hundred eco-
nomic development projects have been incorporated into 
NEPAD. But those which have come to fruition are only 
too rare. Despite the impressive work of the presidents of 
the five founding countries (South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, 
Nigeria, Senegal) foreign aid is below expectations. "All the 
projects have been identified" said Senegalese president 
Abdoulaye Wade. "Now they need to be financed". In a 
similar vein, the African Force deployed in Burundi by the 
AU numbers only 1,250, of the total 2,870 envisaged. The 
South African quota is already on the ground, but the 
Mozambican and Ethiopian troops have not yet been 
deployed, because of a lack of resources. 
Mozambican president Joachim Chissano (right), president of the AU for 
one year, and Amara Essy 
European Union support 
"The ultimate aim is not to send peacekeeping forces here 
or there, but to bolster Africa's own capacity to deal with con-
flict situations and peace enforcement. The African Union's 
Peace and Security Council is crucial. It will provide the polit-
ical authority and act as a focal point for external partners to 
coordinate their efforts", said Romano Prodi, European Com-
mission president, invited to the summit by the African Union. 
"The issue now is whether some development-assistance 
resources should be used upstream, to help with peace-sup-
port operations. This raises a number of political and legal 
questions. But I believe it must be a new shared goal." 
Pierre-André Wiltzer, the French minister delegate for 
cooperation, also favoured a "global and permanent mech-
anism. The current interventions in the Congo and in Côte 
d'Ivoire are necessary. But they are expensive and done on 
an ad hoc basis". 
The link between stability and development is now 
recognised by Africa's international partners. "For the first 
time, along with humanitarian aid, we are speaking about 
support for armed forces. Not in military terms, but with 
the clear political aim of aid for the maintenance of peace," 
said José Teixeira, head of the EU delegation in Maputo. 
The African Union asked the EU to "examine the possi-
bility of setting up a Peace Support Operation Facility 
(PSOF), to fund peace support and peacekeeping opera-
tions conducted under the authority of the AU, thereby 
enhancing the capacity of the Union to play fully its role in 
the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa". 
In Maputo, there was a clear demonstration by African 
leaders that they do not not wish to leave the responsibility 
for peace or war to others. The Mozambican president 
Joaquim Chissano, holding the presidency of the AU for 
the next year, and the Malian Alpha Oumar Konare, elect-
ed for four years to head the AU Commission, have the task 
of convincing Africans and their international partners to 
work together so that this principle becomes a reality. ■ 
President Prodi's speech can be found al the following address: 
hnp://curupa cu.im/rapid/slarl/ 
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il  n  The EU-Africa dialogue is here to stay 
Support in Maputo for a Peace Support Operation Facility 
The Maputo summit was an African Union event, which paved the way to further 
integration of the continent. But it also proved to be a step forward in EU-African 
relations. European Commission president Romano Prodi and EU Commissioner for 
development and humanitarian aid Poul Nielson were invited to attend as observers. 
This provided an occasion for bilateral meetings between them and other African 
leaders. In the margins of the summit, an EU-Africa Troika meeting took place, 
allowing for a high-level political dialogue in an informal setting for the first time 
since the cancellation of the Lisbon EU-Africa summit last year. Commissioner Nielson 
spoke to the Courier about his satisfaction at events in Maputo. 
Dorothy Morrissey 
The cancellation of the EU-Africa summit in 
Lisbon was a low point in the dialogue, says Nielson. "It was 
a casualty of the Zimbabwe issue. But this was not equiva-
lent to stopping the dialogue. We decided to produce a 
Communication on EU-Africa dialogue' to demonstrate the 
vitality of the different elements on the agenda, and that we 
are moving forward on them. We also pushed forward with 
the study on the debt issue. We take seriously the need for a 
broadly organised systematic dialogue on all issues". 
In the area of peace and security, a significant event was 
the support given to the establishment of a Peace Support 
Operation Facility. "It is a kind of Trust Fund, managed and 
decided upon bv the African Union members themselves, in 
order to contribute to the funding of African peacekeeping 
operations," explains Nielson. "The idea came out of my 
analysis of the problem of relying on ad hoc solutions for 
supporting peacekeeping operations in Africa. I was search-
ing for something which would strengthen African owner-
ship, based on the principal of solidarity. We have seen in 
recent years a fantastic performance by prominent African 
statesmen and women in carrying out successful mediation, 
and regional engagements in IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC to 
contain and handle conflicts. I he idea is to fund the Facility 
bv shaving off a small percentage of each country envelope, 
and this was met with clear, strong support from all 
African states. A resolution was adopted asking the 
European Commission to move forward with this and to 
engage with the AU Commission in working out how it 
can be done in practice. This is a clear signal from Maputo 
and, I have to add, it concerns all Africa, also the non-ACP 
parts of Africa." 
The Commissioner envisages that the PSOF will be pre-
sented formally towards the end of the year. Several issues 
still have to be clarified, such as the DAC (Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD) definition of what is 
covered under Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
"The DAC] has a relativelv rigorous language on anything 
military, and this will have to be discussed within the DAC. 
But the relevance is unquestionable; we are not giving funds 
to arms, we are making it possible to carry out peacekeeping 
operations. In conflict situations we are blocked in our work 
of delivering assistance. We also have the problem of com-
mitments not being implemented: very often conflicts. 
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failed states, chaos, disorder, and insecurity are a big part of 
this. Eliminating that obstacle will enable us to do more on 
poverty-oriented work". 
Another important issue for the Commissioner is owner-
ship. He envisages that the Facility will be funded through a 
decision of the partner country. "It is the partner country 
that requests us to contribute to the Facility. Now that the 
Africans are ready to do this, the least we can do is to facili-
tate the funding of it. They have decided this collectively as 
a principal". 
He also sees it as a "special case" of capacity building. "This 
is not just about peace and conflict management, it is also 
about laying the foundation for society to function, creating 
the minimum conditions for governance and stability". 
As for the EU-Africa Troika meeting; "having this in a 
relaxed atmosphere, without formalising it but simply using 
the availability of both sides in the margins of the summit 
shows how we look at the need and importance of a close dia-
logue. The mood of the meeting was extremely positive and 
constructive, and the two sides want to continue this. This 
Troika meeting, as well as the discussion and the positive 
process on the Peace Support Operation Facility, demonstrates 
that the dialogue is alive and well. We have demonstrated an 
ability and a willingness to move forward together, and this is 
a vety strong and positive signal coming out of Maputo. ■ 
1. Communication from the Commission to the CouncUrThe EU-Africa dialogue COM 
(20(H) 516 Hnal.23.6.2003 
Ending wars and starting broad-based recovery are crucial for the African 
continent. The AU is taking steps to develop mechanisms for conflict resolution, 
arbitration, and peacekeeping. 
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East Timor becomes the 79
t
h member 
of the ACP Group 
At its 13 May 2003 meeting in Brussels, the ACP Council of Ministers welcomed a 
new member into the ACP Group, East Timor, bringing the total number of countries 
to 79. The accession was formally approved by the ACP-EC Council of Ministers on 
16 May. East Timor is the world's newest democracy, gaining independence in May 2002. 
Dorothy Morrissey 
East Timor's accession was received with great satisfac-
tion by the Secretary-General of the ACP Group, Jean-Robert 
Goulongana. 
The country's Prime Minister, Dr Mari Alkatiri, also 
expressed his satisfaction in a speech during the 77th Session of 
the ACP Council Ministers in Brussels, on 13 May. He went on 
to express his gratitude to the ACP Group for assisting East 
Timor to become a member: "This positive response to our 
request translates the will of your countries to offer us the 
opportunity to accelerate our development process. This will no 
doubt contribute to the consolidation of our independence and 
our development", said Dr Alkatiri. "We are also aware that 
being an ACP member is not just about privileges but also about 
responsibilities. We would like to underline our conviction that 
with your help we will be able to fulfil our obligations. We are 
taking the first steps in the construction of our state. East Timor 
rose from a heroic struggle, and from international solidarity. 
East Timor will be an independent and solid country with the 
determination of its people and international cooperation. 
From today East Timor is part of the ACP family." 
The country's accession to the Cotonou Agreement is subject 
to East Timorese ratification and to the temporary special 
arrangement that financial assistance provided under the 
Agreement be limited to article 3b of the current Financial 
Protocol (regional cooperation and integration) until the entry 
into force of the 10th EDF. Until then, the country will con-
tinue to receive national support under the Asia and Latin 
America (ALA) budget heading. Annex 6 of Cotonou will be 
amended by adding East Timor to the list of Least Developed 
ACP and Island ACP States. 
Nation building 
East Timor is made up of the eastern half of a small moun-
tainous tropical island in the Indonesian archipelago, about 
400 miles north west of Australia. After three centuries of 
Portuguese colonial rule and 24 years of Indonesian occupa-
tion, Indonesia finally withdrew from East Timor in 
September 1999. Then, for two and a half years, the country 
was administered by UNTAET, the United Nations 
Transitional Administration. In East Timor, the UN had a 
unique mandate. For the first time in history, it took total con-
trol of a country, with all executive, legislative, judicial, and 
even militan' power vested in its appointed administrator, 
Sergio Vieira de Mello'. His mandate was to run the govern-
ment while also transferring power to the Timorese. In May, 
2002, the reins of power were handed over and the 
Democratic Republic of East Timor (in Portuguese; República 
Democrática de Timor-Leste) became an independent 
country. 
ACP Secretary-General Jean-Robert Goulongana congratulates East Timor's 
Prime Minister, Dr Mari Alkatiri, on his country becoming the 79th member 
of the ACP Group. 
East Timor joined the UN in 2002, becoming the 191st 
member. But it started life as a new nation in difficult cir-
cumstances. The UNDP's East Timor Human Development 
Report 2002 ranks it as one of the world's least developed 
countries, with the lowest human development ranking in 
Asia. It has a per capita GDP of just $478, placing it in die-
sarne category as countries such as Angola, Guinea Bissau, 
Rwanda. Some 41 per cent of East Timor's 800,000 people 
live under the poverty line. 
On the positive side, the territory has important oil and 
gas reserves, which lie beneath the sea between East Timor 
and Australia. Assuming that current EEZ discussions are 
successful and that the resources can be exploited and prop-
erly managed, the long-term prospects for the country's 
economy are relatively encouraging. 
EU-East Timor 
Between 1999 and 2002, the F.U committed €143 million 
to the Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET) and to international 
partner agencies for reconstruction and development. Now 
that the country has entered into a long-term development 
phase, the European Commission has developed a Country 
Strateg)' for the period 2002-2006, and expects to commit 
€25.5 million for rural development in 2003 and a further €8 
million for health and for poverty alleviation through forestry 
and rural development for 2004. It is currently working on the 
National Indicative Programme for 2005-2006. Meanwhile, to 
get used to belonging to the ACP family and to familiarise itself 
with EDF procedures, East I ¡mor is eligible to engage in 
regional cooperation with its Pacific ACP neighbours. ■ 
1. Mr Vieira dc Mello was IN special envoy in Iraq. Ik- was killed in the August 
JOd.s terrorisi bombing of the IN headquarters in llaghdad 
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First meeting of ACP Ministers of Culture 
Culture as a driving force 
for development 
The first meeting of Ministers of Culture from the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries was held on 20 June 2003 in Dakar (Senegal). A Declaration and a 
Plan of Action were adopted, intended to herald the start of an innovative approach 
to development from the standpoint of culture and cultural industries. As a prelude to 
this unprecedented conference, cultural actors from ACP countries met on 18 and 19 
June in a networking and professional workshop. 
Alassane Cisse 
In July 2002, the 3rd ACP Heads of State and 
Government summit, meeting in Nadi (Fiji), recom-
mended the organisation of a ministerial conference to 
recognise the essential role of culture and cultural indus-
tries in development. The summit also advised culture 
ministers to undertake all actions aimed at promoting and 
implementing intra-ACP cultural projects. To give con-
crete expression to the Nadi resolutions, Senegal decided, 
with the agreement of the other ACP states, to host the 
event intended to reinforce cultural links within the ACP 
Group. 
ACP countries have tremendous cultural riches, 
which could enhance their development and constitute 
a source of wealth and employment. Considering cul-
ture as the safeguard of their sustainable development 
and maintenance of peace and security, the ACP minis-
ters decided to make cultural industries and creativity 
an essential element of their economic development and 
international cooperation policy, and an objective in 
multilateral trade negotiations. 
In the framework of ACP-EU relations, the Ministers 
of Culture requested the EU to facilitate the movement of 
ACP artists and their work on EU markets, and recom-
mended that culture and cultural industries be included 
in national and regional indicative programmes. 
They also recommended that cultural industries be 
examined at national level, so that their potential to 
contribute to economic development can be assessed. 
They further recommended participating in the elab-
oration of an international instrument on cultural diver-
sity aimed at guaranteeing cultural pluralism and regu-
lating trade in cultural goods and services, and defining 
common cultural strategies in order to take full advan-
tage of the opportunities offered by globalisation. 
Prior to the meeting, a two-day workshop/seminar 
brought together actors and cultural operators from the 
ACP countries in the Douta Seek cultural centre in 
Dakar. The focus of this preliminary meeting was wide-
ranging: to promote cultural industries and inter-ACP 
cultural exchanges, and the networking of actors and 
operators. The idea of "cultural zoning" was advocated, 
its principle being the combining of energies and activ-
ities within geo-cultural sub-regions through collabora-
tive programmes. Following the principle of cultural 
affinities and geographical proximity, states could pro-
mote cultural cooperation within more restricted areas. 
For example, the West African sub-region could collab-
orate on projects and networks, just as the Caribbean 
countries could cooperate in areas concerning the cul-
tural identities of their region. 
Wide-ranging debate 
The aim of this first meeting of ACP Ministers of 
Culture was, in the words of ACP Secretary-General Jean-
Robert Goulongana, "to enable the ACP States to examine 
the issues affecting the role of the ACP countries' cultures 
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in their development policies and... to seek the ways and 
means of promoting the cultures and cultural industries of 
the ACP States and regions". 
Topics such as cultural diversity, globalisation, trade in 
cultural property and services, free movement of cultural 
actors and operators were discussed, all with the central 
theme of how they relate to development strategies. 
Despite diverse opinions, there was a general consensus 
on essentials: 
• culture must be restored to its role of underpinning 
development; 
• creativity in all its forms must be reassessed; 
• theoretical options must be translated into operational 
programmes; 
• culture must become a development priority; 
• training and improvement programmes must be used 
to build the capacities of private and institutional 
operators; 
• the terms of international cultural cooperation must be 
redefined; 
• new inter-ACP cooperation opportunities must be 
identified and exploited; 
• finally, cultural goods and services must be accorded 
special status, given the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) agreements. 
Strategic orientations 
In the Dakar Action Plan, adopted at the end of the 
meeting, ACP Culture Ministers commit themselves 
"formulate, where they do not exist, appropriate cultur-
al policies and legislations, at national and regional lev-
els, and ensure their integration into development 
strategies". It also makes a commitment to "include the 
cultural sector as a priority in the development strategies 
of ACP governments, by working closely with National 
and Regional Authorising Officers (NAOs/RAOs)". 
The ministers adopted measures for the establishment 
of an ACP Cultural Foundation, and the organisation of 
an ACP Cultural Festival. They unanimously chose 
Haiti as the country to host the first edition of the 
Festival in 2004, to coincide with the celebration of the 
bi-centenary anniversary of Haiti's independence. The 
major objectives of the event will be the promotion and 
development of cultural industries, strengthening of 
cultural cooperation between the ACP countries, and 
public-private partnership in ACP states. The ACP 
Festival will take into account all the other cultural 
events taking place in the ACP countries, with the aim 
of harmonising the agendas. The second meeting of the 
ACP Ministers of Culture will be held as a prelude to 
the Festival. 
As for the Foundation, the Ministers recommended 
that a study should be conducted in the very near 
future, especially regarding its financing. 
The Action Plan proposes adopting appropriate meas-
ures in order to widen access to financing; by mecha-
nisms such as guarantee funds, tax "joint-ventures" and 
incentives. It also favours co-production and co-
distribution agreements to ensure the dissemination of 
ACP artistic productions on the international market, 
while safeguarding the intellectual property rights of the 
artists and inventors. Another proposal of the Action 
Plan: the organisation of an ACP workshop on develop-
ing a policy to combat cultural piracy. 
The Dakar meeting received the support of a major 
international organisation: Unesco. That institution's 
message, delivered by Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos, 
Assistant Director-General, responsible for the Africa 
Department, stressed the need to strengthen ACP 
cultural strategies and policies. Unesco would assist in 
the task of mapping out precisely what opportunities 
culture had to offer development, in terms both of areas 
of national sovereignty and at supra-national level. 
Mr Goulongana issued a call to intercultural dialogue 
protagonists, challenging the "uniformisation" of the 
world: "It is not our wish that the world should become 
completely uniform in every aspect of life, and that 
includes culture". In support of this, the conference's 
leitmotif, Mr Goulongana made reference to the abun-
dant cultural potential of the ACP countries — their 
music, dance, gastronomy, fashion, etc. 
One major stumbling block, however, remains: given 
that the ACP countries have Third World economies, 
how are they to finance actions that, in the view of the 
citizens of poor countries, are marginal and non-pro-
ductive? This begs the question of how to persuade 
everybody to accept the idea that culture is a source of 
income and a creator of jobs. ■ 
More information can be found on the ACP Secretariat website: 
http://www.acpsec.org 
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Poul Nielson: development is 
at the top of the EU agenda 
A letter from the Commissioner for development and 
humanitarian aid 
The European Community, like any large donor managing public funds, is not 
exempt from criticism. When well-founded, this can be constructive. But 
criticism can also be misinformed, and based on an incomplete understanding 
of the issues involved. Here, we publish excerpts of Commissioner Poul 
Nielson's response to some recent criticisms of EC aid in the European press, 
where he outlines recent changes and evolutions in EC development policy. 
"This ¡S not the first time that EC aid has been crit-
icised. Of course I accept, at any time, a discussion about 
how to improve Europe's contribution to the fight against 
poverty, as this has been the main focus of my efforts over 
the last three and a half years. 
In recent years the European Commission has made fun-
damental changes to the way we carry out development 
cooperation. In the first general policy statement ever, which 
I presented in April 2000, the fight against poverty was 
made the main objective. We also introduced a new multi-
annual programming system, improved quality in program-
ming, and took concrete steps to improve ownership and 
complementarity. We have clarified our policy, pursued sec-
toral concentration, enhanced the participation of civil soci-
ety, and introduced the progressive integration of perform-
ance indicators in programming. We have strengthened our 
delegations and reduced the delivery time. 
As commissioner responsible for EU development aid, I 
have no reason to be complacent about our performance. On 
the contrary, I have continued to be very vocal on the need to 
make changes. Decisions and proposals to improve the situa-
tion have been flowing steadily since. 
But despite recent successful changes in EC programming 
procedures it has not yet been possible to tackle the big prob-
lem of the unspent balances, whether it's the European 
Development Fund (EDF), which is part of the Cotonou 
Agreement between the EU and 77 developing countries in 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), or rhe pro-
grammes financed from the regular external aid budget. 
The EDF 
Let me recall the main facts. The total figure for EDF 
funds allocated to ACP countries until the end of 2002 
(6th, 7th, and 8th EDFs combined) is €32.4 billion. Of 
this figure €29.9 billion has been formally committed, 
meaning that decisions have been taken to go ahead on spe-
cific projects. Of these allocations and commitments, 
€21.6 billion has been disbursed. Accordingly, at the end 
of 2002, the "gap" stood at €10.8 billion. This gap is made-
up of €2.5 billion allocated but not committed, and the 
remaining €8.3 billion committed but not yet paid. 
Let me deal with the €2.5 billion allocated but not com 
mitted. As a first step, funds are earmarked country by 
country. I Iowever, actual cooperation may subsequently be 
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suspended with a given country for political or practical 
reasons (civil wars, the security situation etc.). This means 
that no commitments (specific projects) can be approved. 
To give an impression of the size of the problem, consider 
that €1.7 billion is allocated to past or current "crisis" coun-
tries such as the Comoros, Liberia, Eritrea, Sudan, Haiti, 
Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, the 
Central African Republic, Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Madagascar. Cooperation with these countries has been, or is, 
frozen, and the funds cannot, under the present legal frame-
work, then be spent elsewhere. Allocarions remain frozen 
until the EU Member States decide to resume cooperation 
with the given country. 
However, since the EU is legally obliged under rhe Cotonou 
Agreement to be present and active everywhere, including in 
countries where no other donors want to work, the 
Commission - unlike the Member States - cannot and should 
not walk away. 
"Unpaid" commitments 
As for the €8.3 billion committed but not paid, all donors 
have large amounts of "unpaid" commitments. It simply 
means that a donor has to get programmes and projecrs 
agreed before contracting and payments can start. For the 
Commission, this amount is larger at the start of a new EDF 
cycle (ie in 2003 for the 9th EDF) where the Commission is 
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agreed (commitred). At the same time, I 
would like to stress that our unspent 
commitments are close ro rhe average for 
EU Member States. Considering the 
budgetary and legal contexts, the 
Commission's performance could be con-
sidered comparatively good. 
I do, however, see a problem wirh "a 
slow and old" share of the €8.3 billion in 
unspent commitments; the commitments 
approved (committed) before 1997 for 
which we have seen no disbursements. For the EDF, we esti-
mare that this problem represenrs €1.4 billion — a rather 
small proportion of the total EDF money allocated to ACP 
countries. We are of course pursuing an active policy in 
reducing this figure. In 2002 the total amount was reduced 
by €310 million and estimates for the year 2003 indicate a 
further reduction by €470 million. 
There is a lengthy time lag between the moment decisions 
are announced and when things actually happen on the 
ground. This was one of rhe first things I addressed on my 
arrival in September 1999. I have again and again made 
these problems clear to the European Parliament, to the 
Council and to the public, and I have received strong and 
broad support for the actions taken to address the problems. 
So what are the solutions we are pursuing? 
Administrative reform must be implemented. On reform 
of the Commission administrative structures for external 
aid, the Peer Review undertaken by the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee concluded in June 
2002: "The EC has made substantial progress since January 
2001 with organisational and management reforms of its 
development and humanitarian aid system. Of parricular 
nore are improvements to accountability at all levels, the 
introduction of the Country Strategy Papers process, the 
speedy and efficient delivery of humanirarian aid, the clar-
ification of the links between relief and development, 
improved evaluation systems, and progress in the decision-
making process with Member States and with déconcentra-
tion of authority to field offices". 
The reform of external assistance launched in May 2000 
by myself and my colleague, Commissioner Chris Patten, 
led to the establishment of the EuropeAid Cooperation 
Office on 1 January 2001. The idea is to concentrate in a 
single Commission service all external cooperation pro-
grammes, with the exception of the enlargement countries. 
We have improved budget execution and the pre-1995 
backlog of old and dormant commitments has been cut by 
76 per cent. A new Financial Regulation incorporates impor-
tant improvements for the management of external assistance. 
Decentralisation must be pursued. Since the EuropeAid 
Cooperation Office started the extensive work of "décon-
centration", organised in three phases to cover gradually all 
EC Delegations concerned, we have gone a long way. 
Déconcentration is today operational in 45 Delegations. 
Attention is now concentrated on the remaining 
30 Delegations of the third wave this year, essentially in the 
ACP region, as well as on the so-called non "gcographised" 
programmes such as food security, human rights, micro-
projects and the rehabilitation and refugee budget lines. 
The EU is legally obliged 
under the Cotonou 
Agreement to be present 
and active everywhere, 
including in countries 
where no other donors 
focus 
want to work: the 
Commission - unlike the 
Member States - cannot 
and should not walk away. 
In this context, it should be noted that, 
on average, Commission officials deal 
with a certain amount of resources meas-
ured in multiples of €10 million of aid 
per year. I heir colleagues in a Member 
State administration handle an average 
amount that is three to seven times lower. 
We are "decommitting" the "old and 
slow". To accelerate reduction of the 
backlog, the Commission has started to 
identify dormant commitments. We 
plan to use them quickly for new and 
urgenr priorities. This could encounter some resistance 
from countries that lose what they would consider ro be 
"their resources". But it is important to forge ahead with 
rhis and reallocate the currently unused funds to where they 
can be used more effectively. We need to reconsider proce-
dures with our ACP partners. 
Untying of aid. The important question of untying aid 
from national (commercial) interests remains an ongoing 
srory. The Commission has made its proposal. We are wait-
ing for the Council to play its role. 
The EDF should be "budgetised'. I his is not a new idea, 
but it is increasingly urgent. The EDF is not an integral part 
of the general budget of the EU. This is an anomaly. The 
EDF is an important policy domain of the EU and should as 
such be subject to normal parliamentary control, as other 
policy domains are. Integration of the EDF in the General 
Budget would achieve this objective and bring about a single 
legal framework for the management of development funds. 
Options for further administrative reform should be con-
sidered. Inrernal adminisrrative strucrures can still be 
improved. The question is whether to do it now, or let the 
next Commission complete the job. The Commission, 
under rhe overall srrategic authority of President Prodi, has 
decided to postpone further improvements of the system. 
Member States should grant greater flexibility. In principle, 
the Cotonou Agreement has some built-in mechanisms to 
address this problem. Annual reviews allow for flexibility in 
the use of resources. But due to the slow ratification of the 
Cotonou Agreement by IiU Member States, the Commission 
was not able to apply this mechanism for two-and-a-half years. 
It is only since 1 April 2003, when the Cotonou 
Agreement entered into force, that all provisions have been 
operational. Similarly, the mid-term reviews ol the country 
strategy papers can lead ro a revision of the strategy and to 
a revision of the financial allocation. Those countries per-
forming well will benefit from an increased allocation and 
low performers will have rheir allocations reduced. I hese 
mid-term reviews are due for the year 2004. 
The Commission started, in 2002-2003, to systematical-
ly reconstitute reserves from unallocated/unused resources 
(countries with longstanding frozen cooperation or cooper-
ation suspended for political reasons) in view of re-
directing them towards global initiatives (debt relief, Global 
Health Fund, Education for All initiatives, etc) for which 
no other reserves were available. 
Are Member States ready to relax control? EC develop-
ment assistance is being managed through a complex sys-
tem of financial regulations, which consumes an enormous 
amount of scarce Commission staffing resources. There is 
some room for improvement. 
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Other policy areas 
It has been alleged that I have no influence on matters 
relating to trade, agriculture, access to medicines, and fish-
eries policy. My reaction to this is: "You can do a lot of 
good il you are prepared not to take the credit for it". 
I am interested in what can be done. Visibility is fine -
feasibility is better. Indeed, one of the main general weak-
nesses of the Commission in the area of development coop-
eration - and I could add, the European Union as a whole 
- has been the temptation to draw media attention to things 
that never materialised, simply because the announcement 
was considered more important than the implementation. 
This is in fact part of the reason why the Prodi Commission 
inherited a very large development aid backlog. 
As to whether development policy concerns have been 
taken into account in various other policy areas, it is enough 
to look at the results. On trade policy, the fact is that since 
1999 the European Commission has been pursuing a trade 
policy that puts the interests of developing countries at the 
centre of attention. Trade issues are dealt with at length in 
the Cotonou Agreement. The Commission also succeeded 
in securing agreement with the Council on the "Everything 
but Arms" initiative, giving the 49 least developed countries 
complerely tariff- and quota-free access to EU markets by 
2006. The offers submitted by the EC to the Doha 
Development Round are all explicitly development-friendly. 
As to the reform of the common agricultural policy 
(GAP), I should note that the Commission has made a pro-
posal, now adopted by the Council, allowing the EU to 
play a progressive developmenr-oriented role in WTO dis-
cussions on agriculture. The EU offer on agriculture in the 
Doha round is definitely the biggest single undertaking in 
eliminating export subsidies for a long time. 
On communicable diseases, the Commission's overall pol-
icy on dealing with AIDS, TB and malaria, including rhe pol-
icv on tiered pricing, was first set out in a polity developed by 
the Directorate-General for Development under my political 
responsibility. Following endorsement bv Member States, it is 
still being pursued within this framework. 
On fisheries policy, Commissioner Fischler and I jointly 
initiated the debate on this issue at an early stage of the 
Commission mandate. The relevant parts of the reform 
proposal on the common fisheries policy (CFP) have been 
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"The EU offer on agriculture in the Doha round is definitely the biggest 
single undertaking in eliminating export subsidies for a long time." 
designed to my full satisfaction, ensuring that problems of 
European surplus capacity are not exported to developed 
countries with declining fish stocks. 
Defining the role of EU development cooperation 
On the question of whether there should be a "common 
European policy for the Third World" I should draw atten-
tion to the Treaty (art. 177), which says Community policy 
in the sphere of development cooperation "shall be comple-
mentary to the policies pursued by the Member Srates". 
However there has been some progress towards a genuine 
common European development policy. It has been my clear 
objective to define a role for EU development cooperation 
that complements the bilateral efforts of Member States. 
This succeeded in November 2000, when the 
Commission and the Council reached a clear agreemenr on 
how to organise this division of roles. This agreement gives 
the Commission key responsibilities in areas such as macro-
economic support; trade-relared assistance; regional coop-
erarion; economic infrastructure (roads); rural development 
and general capacity building. 
In addition, leading to the UN Conference on Financing 
for Development, the 15 EU Heads of State decided to 
increase development aid in order to increase EU aid from 
the present 0.33 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) 
to 0.39 per cent in 2006. The Commission is monitoring 
progress and has submitted first a report to the May 
Council of Ministers. 
We are trying to see whether further coordination and har-
monisation at EU level would make sense. In the context of the 
Monterrey follow-up, all Member States agreed rhat we should 
formulate proposals for raking this forward in four pilot coun-
tries (Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Vietnam). 
In preparation for the Johannesburg summit on sustain-
able development, the EU agreed to launch common ini-
tiatives on water and energy. This naturally calls for close 
coordination of Community and bilateral efforts. The 
Commission recently proposed using €1 billion to set up a 
European Water Fund. 
We can still do better. We need to ensure that the 50 per 
cent of world official development aid (ODA) that we deliv-
er pulls in the same direction. It should not mean we all have 
to do the same. But to become more efficient we have got to 
work more in synergy and towards the same objectives, each 
doing what he does best. One instrument would be regional 
and country strategies agreed by the Union and framing our 
common action. For this, I see a need for some better Treaty 
language, and I have raised this issue in the context of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe. 
My view on NGOs and/or multilateral programmes is 
that both have different strengths and weaknesses, and that 
actually we do not do enough to support broader sector 
programmes in coordination with other donors. In general, 
I would like to see an increase in the average size of aid pro-
grammes and their impact, the development of sector pro-
grammes further supported, transaction costs minimised 
and Commission staff employed more efficiently. This can 
notably mean working with UN agencies where they have 
a recognised comparative advantage for doing what Europe 
wants to do. I really cannot see the problem in this." ■ 
The complete version of this Idler is available on Commissioner Nielsons website ill: 
l)llii;//euroo,i.eu.inl/eommA'ommissioners/nielson/leilrrs/ 
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Non-state actors 
and Cotonou 
One of the most innovative elements of the ACP-EC Cotonou Partnership Agreement is that it 
enshrines the principle of participative development. If ACP governments are still in charge of 
determining the development strategy of their countries, non-state actors must now be involved not 
only in project implementation, but also in political dialogue, planning, and evaluation of results. 
Non-state actors include the private sector, economic and social partners (including trade union 
organisations), and civil society "in all its forms according to national characteristics." This also 
implies that "civil society" goes beyond only NGOs to include human rights groups, grassroots 
organisations, women's associations, environmental movements, farmers' organisations, indigenous 
people's representatives, religious organisations, research institutes, cultural associations, and media. 
With this background in mind, this dossier provides a preliminary assessment of the involvement of 
non-state actors in the consultation process, which is the process by which resources are allocated to 
an ACP country (or region). In the first set of articles, after a general overview, Pa'o Luteru from the 
ACP Secretariat and Françoise Moreau from the European Commission show a certain degree of 
optimism about the involvement of non-state actors in the programming process. The second set of 
articles (Simon Stocker from Eurostep and an interview with the President of CONCORD Frans Polman) 
deals with the challenges that European NGOs face in the Cotonou Agreement. A more critical 
approach is provided in the third set of articles, which reports on the experiences of three ACP 
NGOs, all of them members of the ACP Civil Society Forum. The fourth set of articles focuses on the 
role of other non-state actors, and in particular the somewhat disappointing experience of the ACP 
Business Forum and the ACP Local Government Platform, while members of the trade unions 
movement are still fighting to be considered as stakeholders of development. 
Maurizio Carbone 
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There are three ways to 
conceptualise power in society: 
the power of the government 
(the Prince), the power of the 
market (the Merchant), and the 
power of the people (the 
Citizen). This article reviews the 
role of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) in 
development policy, explaining 
why they became the favoured 
child of official development 
agencies, a magic bullet that 
could be fired in any direction 
and would still find its target; it 
also addresses some of the 
challenges they must face in the 
next decade if they are to 
survive. 
Maurizio Carbone 
In the past twenty years, the field of development has 
been dominated by the so-called New Policy Agenda. If the 
1960s were the years of the "myth of the state" (the state could 
provide for all the needs of all citizens) by the end of the 1970s 
the "myth of the market" (the private sector could provide for all 
the consumption needs of all consumers) dominated develop-
ment theory and practice. Finally, by the end of the 1980s, a new 
myth was found: "the myth of the market plus civil society". 
Despite the fact that civil society has come to play a major role 
in development policy, there is still a sort of terminological ambi-
guity. Some organisations may be called non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in one country, voluntary organisations 
(VOs) or non-profit organisations (NPOs) in other countries. 
The Cotonou Agreement refers to non-state actors and recognis-
es their key role in the development process, which must be com-
plementary to that of the state. 
Farmers in Guyana. The debate on good governance called for more pluralism 
and for giving a voice to the people in national development planning. 
The role of non-state actors 
in development policy: 
ons 
nging practices 
irAD/Horst Wagni 
Such ambiguity derives also from the fact that there is not such 
a thing as a typical CSO, but this term can be applied to many 
kinds of organisations, ranging from large Northern NGOs to 
local self-help organisations in the South. This article refers to 
self-governing (able to manage their own affairs), private initia-
tives (even though they may receive a substantial amount of 
resources from governments), involved in development issues on 
a non-profit basis (any financial surplus does not accrue to own-
ers but is ploughed back into the organisation). 
An associational revolution 
The number and profile of CSOs, both in the North and the 
South, has grown exponentially since the 1980s, when they were 
still marginalised actors in the development process. Several 
reasons have been provided for what has been called an "associa-
tional revolution", comparable in importance with the rise of the 
nation state in the nineteenth century. 
First, policymakers had overestimated the capacity of the state 
to initiate and deliver development. In post-war thinking, the 
state was considered to be both the engine and guide for eco-
nomic growth; under the rubric of structural adjustments donors 
looked for alternatives to the old principle "government-to-
government aid". Markets and private initiatives were thus seen 
as the most efficient mechanisms for achieving economic growth 
and providing most services to most people. The growing recog-
nition given to civil society by international donors was meant as 
an essential counterweight to some of these market-oriented 
strategies: donors decided to support civil society because it was 
able to provide services to those who could not be reached 
through the market. 
Second, as in the changing context of development coopera-
tion new issues such as environment, gender, and social develop-
ment were included, CSOs began to gain increased access to pol-
icymakers and demanded that their ideas would finally be taken 
seriously. Moreover, the debate on good governance initiated 
(some would say imposed) by the World Bank called for more 
pluralism and for giving a voice to the people in national devel-
opment planning. Finally, a series of international conferences, 
held in the 1990s, contributed to giving CSOs more visibility 
and space for action. 
Third, by meaning different things to different people, CSOs 
became an appealing concept to all the spectrum of politics. For 
liberals, they could balance state and business interests, prevent-
ing abuses from both sides; for neo-liberals, they were part of the 
private sector, advancing the cause for a sort of privatisation of 
aid; for the left, they were a promise of the dream of "new poli-
tics", capable of offering the chance of social transformation. 
Service delivery and policy advocacy 
CSOs play mainly two roles in development policy: 
1. implementers, and thus they are involved in the delivery of 
goods and services, which may also entail being contracted by a 
government; 
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Donors decided to support civil 
reached through the market. 
2. catalysts, defined as the ability to 
inspire, facilitate or contribute 
towards development change. This is 
not an either/or solution, but over the 
past few years, many CSOs have 
moved from a "supply-side" approach, 
which concentrated only on develop-
ment projects, to also a "demand-
side" approach, which seeks to help 
communities to articulate their pref-
erences and concerns in order to 
become more active participants in 
the development process. The 
Cotonou Agreement acknowledges 
this change and for the first time in 
the history of the relationship 
between the EU and the ACP, CSOs 
are to be involved in the planning, 
implementation and evaluation stages of the cooperation pro-
grammes while, at the same time, they have greater access to 
funds and capacity-building support. 
Four arguments have been advanced to show the comparative 
advantage of CSOs in development: 
• Social argument: working at the micro-level, they are able to 
reach the most disadvantaged people, who are often by-passed 
by the larger projects of multilateral donors; 
• Economic argument: being comparatively small in size, less 
bureaucratic, cheaper, and more cost-effective, they are very 
efficient at providing services because of both low labour cost 
and incomplete pricing (i.e. reliance on voluntary local inputs; 
lack of transaction costs); 
• Political argument: they are immune from changing political 
tides, as they do not have hidden agendas nor are guided by 
political considerations; they can also reach countries that are 
deemed hostile for a donor and from which official aid is with-
held; 
• Cultural argument: they are particularly sensitive to the needs 
of the poor as they are embedded more in the local culture, with 
many people working permanently on the ground; further-
more, due to their relationship with local communities, they 
can foster participatory approaches to development. 
Threats and challenges 
These assumptions about the comparative advantages of CSOs 
have been increasingly challenged. Indeed, at the beginning of 
the new millennium, CSOs experienced excitement tempered by 
anxiety. The excitement comes from the expanding opportunities 
for civic action that global trends are creating; CSOs can thus act 
as a sort of countervailing force to the expanding of markets and 
the declining authority of the state. 
Anxiety comes from the questions they are asked to answer 
about performance, accountability, and legitimacy. It is clear that 
some "compassion fatigue" has emerged among donors. 
in Lomé, Togo. 
society because it was able to provide services to those who could not be 
This, though, does not mean that the total amount of money dis-
bursed through CSOs has decreased, but donors are now more 
demanding. If in the past the question of effectiveness of CSOs 
was taken for granted, now it can no longer be assumed. 
Governments and international donors also wonder why they 
should fund or listen to CSOs. In other words, are these self-
appointed organisations legitimate representatives of the poor? 
This question is linked to the issue of accountability. If, legal-
ly, CSOs must be accountable to patrons, be they trustees, 
donors, or governments (upward accountability), morally they 
are accountable to their beneficiaries and the community they 
work with (downward accountability). Because of the threat of 
withdrawal of funding, CSOs now tend more and more to focus 
on accountability towards donors rather than towards beneficiar-
ies. As they get closer to donors, CSOs become more bureau-
cratic, using donor techniques for programming, implementing, 
monitoring and accounting, recruiting English-speaking people-
to satisfy the needs of donors, and ultimately even changing the 
culture of the CSO itself. This process is gradual, but potentially 
catastrophic. 
If they are to survive, CSOs should concentrate more on 
"innovation", which is still assumed to be an area of compara-
tive advantage vis-à-vis the state. Indeed, in the past they have 
proved to be innovative in many sectors (e.g. microcredit, agri-
culture, participatory planning), but they still have a unique-
experience in development that could probably easily feed into 
new models of good practice and innovation, as well as policy 
making. The current climate calls upon them to play this new 
role if they want to find new relevance in the development 
field. But to do so they must work together, in partnerships 
among themselves, with research groups, and with donors. 
Only if they succeed will they continue to have an impact on 
both their international operations and the wider policy-
making area. ■ 
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One of the most dynamic 
innovations of the ACP-EC 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
is the more visible and vibrant 
role envisaged for non-state 
actors. Article 6 of the 
Agreement defines non-state 
actors (NSAs) under three main 
categories: private sector, 
economic and social groups, 
"and civil society in all its forms 
according to national 
characteristics". The recognition 
by the ACP and the EU sides of 
non-state actors will ultimately 
depend on the degree to which 
they address the needs of the 
population, their specific 
competences and levels of 
organisation, and the extent to 
which they are managed in a 
transparent and efficient 
manner. 
Dr Pa'o Luteru* 
Improved communication about and 
understanding of the provisions of the 
Cotonou Agreement will contribute to 
enhanced consultation processes and the 
ultimate objective of empowering non-
state actors. 
A pioneer role 
for both the ACP and the EU 
The promotion of NSA involvement in development 
cooperation is a dynamic issue which requires a dynamic 
response. At this juncture, the ACP Group is faced with 
numerous challenges, and is responding in a proactive manner 
to the many exciting prospects for the advancement of non-
state actors. 
User's Guide for ACP non-state actors 
Improved communication about and understanding of the 
provisions or the Cotonou Agreement will contribute to 
enhanced consultation processes and the ultimate objective of 
empowering NSAs. 
In this regard, work is currently being undertaken to prepare 
a User's Guide for non-state actors. The Guide will serve as an 
information source for NSAs to facilitate their full involvement 
in the relevant provisions of the Cotonou Agreement. This exer­
cise will have the added value of providing practical examples of 
NSA involvement in sectoral policy making, their participation 
in the programming exercise, good practices in the implementa­
tion of national and regional indicative programme priorities 
and rheir participation in the monitoring and evaluation of 
F.DF projects. 
Eligibility criteria for NSAs' access to EDF resources 
A notable achievement for both the ACP Group and the EU was 
the successful formulation of eligibility criteria for NSAs' access to 
EDF resources. The eligibility criteria document was adopted at 
the 28th Session of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers in May 
2003, and is an important milestone. 
The criteria will operate as a general guide for the identification of 
NSAs eligible for supporr under national and regional indicative pro­
grammes. A key feature is the stipulation that the operational modal­
ities for NSAs' access to EDF resources are to be defined in accor­
dance with national and regional characteristics. In terms of policy 
dialogue, the eligibility criteria endorse the principle that non-state 
actors should have clearly defined interests, be representative and 
should operate in a transparent and accountable manner within the 
broader framework of national and regional programmes. It is also 
accepted that access to funding will be limited to non-profit NSAs. 
The criteria stipulate that Steering Committees will be created to 
take the final decision on eligibility in individual ACP countries 
and regions. The Committee is to comprise the National 
Authorising Officers/Regional Authorising Officers, the relevant 
ACP government authorities, a mandated non-state actor repre-
sentative(s), and a representative of the EC Delegation. 
Θ 
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In terms of resource allocation, discussions thus far within the 
ACP Group have reinforced the view that funds should be grant-
ed on the basis of NSAs' capability and capacity to deliver the rel-
evant services effectively. This approach reinforces the provisions 
of the Cotonou Agreement, which stipulate that non-state actors 
are to play a complementary role in national and regional devel-
opment. 
The eligibility criteria is therefore a useful tool to facilitate the 
full participation of NSAs in the implementation process, and 
provides a solid foundation for further refinement in accordance 
wirh defined ACP national and regional priorities. 
ACP Civil Society Task Force 
The Belgian Presidency of the EU and the ACP Secretariat 
jointly organised the first ACP-EC Civil Society Forum in 
Brussels from 6 ro 7 July 2001. The forum focused on NSA par-
ticipation in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. 
The proceedings concluded with a Declaration and a Plan of 
Action, which outlined the general objectives and the specific 
modalities to strengthen, inter alia, NSA strucrures, capacity-
building, advocacy at the ACP national, sub-regional and global 
levels. As a follow-up activity, the ACP Secretariat is now engaged 
in discussions on agreeing with all stakeholders on a process that 
would ensure the effective follow-up of decisions arising from 
that first ACP-EC Civil Society Forum. 
The ACP states remain committed to promoting the increased 
participation and involvement of NSAs in all issues relating to 
ACP-EC cooperation. 
A sign of the times - ACP NAOs and RAOs plan for 
more inclusive NSA consultation processes 
A true indicator of the new and more visible role envisaged for 
non-state actors became evident in the discussions during the last 
two meetings of the principal ACP managers of EDF allocations -
the National and Regional Authorising Officers (NAOs and RAOs). 
The increased level of non-state actor participation was dis-
cussed at the 6th and 7th Meetings of the ACP National and 
Regional Authorising Officers, held in December 2001 and May 
2003 respectively. On both occasions, the discussions acknowl-
edged the importance of a well organised, accountable and trans-
parent civil society, in the development cooperation process. 
Following these detailed discussions, there was consensus on 
the need to establish effective coordination and consultation 
mechanisms for non-state actor involvement, as a high priority. 
The NAOs and RAOs discussions endorsed the principle of 
decentralisation at national and regional level, and further high-
lighted the urgent need to establish a national and regional poli-
cy framework, wirh related consultation mechanisms. 
These conclusions confirm the commitment of AGP states to 
involve NSAs in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. 
Effective participation and involvement of NSAs in 
EPA negotiations 
ACP discussions so far on the parricipation of non-state actors 
in the negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
have led to the establishment of general principles and elements 
to constitute a strateg)- for their effective involvement. The 
Group is of the view that existing mechanisms for NSA partici-
pation at national and regional levels in the implementation of 
the Cotonou Agreement are to be respected and further empow-
ered for EPA negotiations. 
This is seen as part of the wider goal to maximize the poten-
tial advantages of a coherent, united and inclusive approach to 
the negotiations involving all ACP actors. The Group recognis-
es rhar a consultative approach will not only enrich the process, 
but will strengthen the commitment of all parties to the 
outcomes. 
It is clear that whilst NSAs are organised in some ACP coun-
tries, this is not the case in others. To this end, rhe ACP Group 
supports the development of appropriate national and regional 
structures for NSA participation in the EPA negotiations, and t he-
development of ACP capacity, as priority issues. 
Gender Focus 
The Cotonou Agreement provides rhe framework to address 
the needs of one of the most vulnerable groups — women. The 
Agreement's gender sensitive approach is timely, relevant and 
rherefore commendable, as it provides rhe required general frame-
work, as well as a stable foundation to promote and consolidate 
the development of civil society organisations that specifically 
deal with issues rehiring to women. 
The Cotonou Agreement states that development cooperation 
will support ACP states' efforts to develop general and sectoral 
policies and reforms that improve coverage, quality and access to 
basic infrastructures and services. In particular, account will be 
taken of local needs and the specific demands of the most vul-
nerable and disadvantaged, thus reducing the inequalities of 
access to these services. 
The Agreement's general objective of poverty eradication also 
makes provision for systematic account to be taken of the situa-
tion of women and gender issues in the political, economic and 
social spheres. 
As such, the ACP Group will continue to invest its efforts in 
improving women's access to the required resources, recognising 
that this will enable them to fully exercise their fundamental rights. 
Determined to take up the challenge 
The key challenge for all parties concerned is to ensure that 
NSAs are provided with the means and support to enable them 
to participate fully and effectively in ACP-F.C cooperation. 
The immediate tasks ahead are many and challenging. The 
ACP and the EU are committed to deliver in this vital area by 
advancing the justified cause of the NSAs. The mid-term review 
promises to be the next visible platform, where the challenges ol 
a more inclusive approach to development cooperation are to be 
tackled in a forthright manner. 
The ACP Secretariat remains resolute to continue to provide-
support to the ACP Group in its efforts to facilitate the full 
involvement of non-state-actors in the Cotonou Agreement's 
consultative mechanisms and implementation procedures. ■ 
* Assistant Secretary General, (ìcncral Secretarial of the AC!' Croup 
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makes the participatory 
approach at all levels of 
cooperation a binding 
obligation for both the EU 
and the ACP States. This 
article looks at progress made 
in implementing the 
provisions regarding the 
involvement of non-state 
actors in the first stage of the 
programming exercise 
undertaken for the 9th 
European Development Fund. 
Françoise Moreau* 
The decision to make poverty reduction the central objective 
ol the Cotonou Agreement, the démocratisation process occur-
ring in developing countries and the emergence of better organ-
ised non-state actors made it essential to ensure the widest possi-
ble participation of all sectors of society in the definition and for-
mulation ol development cooperation policies and priorities. The 
Cotonou Agreement, recognising the complementary role of state 
and non-state actors (NSAs) in the development process, con-
tains innovative provisions to promote participatory approaches: 
non-state actors are now involved in the process leading to the 
definition of the development and cooperation strategies, accord-
ing to each country's individual circumstances. This approach 
contributes to enhancing ownership of development strategies by 
the beneficiaries, consolidating accountable, sound and demo-
cratic institutions, exercising citizenship, and facilitating public-
private partnerships. In the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement, 
participation starts at the level of the dialogue on national devel-
opment strategies, sectoral policies and programming. 
The new programming process 
The programming process, which is now being applied not only 
to the ACP states but also to all countries and regions benefiting 
from EC aid, is based on the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) 
designed at country level. The purpose of rhe CSPs is to provide a 
framework for IvU assistance programmes based on the partner 
country's own policy agenda, KU objectives, an analysis of the 
country's situation, and the activities of other major partners. The 
GSP points to where Community assistance will be directed and 
how it integrates with what other donors are doing. CSPs thus 
contribute to better planning of cooperation activities, improved 
donor coordination/complementarity, and greater overall coher-
ence of external assistance policy with other EU policies. A flexi-
ble and regular review mechanism aims at making it possible to 
continuously update the GSP, the volume of resources and the 
indicative programme according to needs and performance. 
In ortler to assess progress made in implementing the provi-
sions of the Cotonou Agreement, the Commission services have 
produced a preliminary quantitative and qualitative assessment of 
the involvement of NSAs in the EG-ACP programming process 
undertaken for the period 2002-2006. Sixty-three Gountry 
Strategy Papers (about 80 per cent of the total) have so far been 
examined; thus the findings ol this exercise should be considered 
provisional. 
n voi vi n 
in the programming process: 
a preliminary assessment 
A quantitative assessment 
It appears that a consultation process was conducted in 59 out 
of the 63 CSPs analysed. In the majority of cases (50 out of 63), 
the CSPs describe the broad categories of actors which have been 
identified for the consultation. Traditionally, NGOs have usual-
ly been represented more than other NSAs. In 32 countries, 
social and economic partners were however also specifically 
mentioned. 
To avoid duplication and strengthen coordination, most con-
sultations have built upon existing national consultation mecha-
nisms set up with the donor community (e.g. PRSPs). In some 
other countries, the EU took the initiative to launch studies or 
mapping exercises to get a better picture of NSAs, their structures, 
activities and potential contribution to ACP-EU cooperation 
(e.g. Namibia, Cameroon, Guinea Bissau). In other countries, the 
programming process has led to the creation of new functional 
bodies involving state and non-state actors (e.g. Chad). 
In general terms, consultation during the first phase of the pro-
gramming process has been satisfactory, but should be further 
improved in view of the review process. Following the consulta-
tion process, the draft CSP was modified in 36 cases. As for the 
remaining 23 countries, the following explanations were offered: 
in some countries consultation started at a too advanced stage of 
the CSP, making it difficult to reorient the process; in other cases 
coincidence of governments and NSAs views was identified; 
finally, in a limited number of cases the lack of capacity of NSAs 
to put forward concrete and coherent proposals was noted. 
The analysis also shows that different types of strategies have 
been followed for planning the involvement of NSAs in the 
implementation of cooperation programmes. This variety proba-
bly reflecrs diverging political and institutional conditions at 
country level, including capacity constraints in EU Delegations. 
Three strategies can be identified for involving NSAs. First, in a 
number of countries the response strategy is geared at enhancing 
NSA participation in all sectors of EC cooperation and by differ-
ent means (mainstreaming). Second, NSA involvement is mainly 
foreseen in the focal sectors. Third, support to NSAs in non-focal 
sectors is provided, either as a means for targeting poor popula-
tion groups or as a contribution to good governance and conflict 
prevention. 
As for the three possible sources of funding foreseen by the 
Cotonou Agreement (access to EDF funding, participation in the 
implementation of focal or non-focal sector programmes, EU 
thematic budget lines), in a majority of cases a provision for EDF 
funding is proposed. 
A qualitative assessment 
As for the quality of the consultation process, the Commission 
services have identified three areas to assess the NSA involve-
ment and identify constraints and best practices to overcome 
them: 
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consultation process. An effective dialogue is based on well-
informed parties with the capacity to put forward ideas and 
proposals in a constructive way. However, in a number of 
cases, it was recognised that information was given out late, 
with the result that some organisations were not able to 
attend. 
2) Criteria for the selection of participants in the consultation 
process. In some cases, the selection of participants was 
jointly made by the National Authorising Officer (NAO) 
and the EU Delegation who invited NSAs who either had 
an existing working relationship with the EU Delegation 
and the NAO or a strong reputation in the country; in other 
cases, studies were put in place; finally, in one case, a local 
NGO, appointed by the Delegation to organise the consul-
tation process, proposed the list of participants. 
3) Follow-up to the consultation process. Once the process was 
conducted, informing NSAs about the results of the consul-
tation process was not an easy task: lack of communication 
and information-sharing mechanisms between NSAs is a 
major bottleneck for information distribution. E-mail facil-
ities, websites of key NGOs or the media were used in a 
number of cases to disseminate information. Hard copies 
with relevant information were distributed. The strengthen-
ing of NSA platforms or NSA informal networks would 
facilitate and improve communication and information 
sharing. 
In general terms, the qualitative outcomes of the consulta-
tion process are encouraging. NSAs have certainly shown that 
they have useful inputs to bring to the consultations. 
However, NSAs are not always able to capitalise on the oppor-
tunities that exist to participate in the development process. 
They may have a fragile organisational structure, be inexperi-
enced, or they may be operating in a difficult political envi-
ronment. 1 heir level ol analysis and information can be weak, 
which results in a tendency to select larger NSAs based in the 
capital of the country, which are better informed and are well 
placed ro have a more elaborated point ol view. Further work 
needs to be done to ensure that NSAs bring forward the voice 
of the grassroots, and that those in urban areas can liaise with 
local communities in the rural areas. 
Strengthening southern non-state actors is a long process. 
Past experience shows that the locus should be on internal 
structure and organisation, constituency building (broadening 
networks), the development of analytical and advocacy skills 
and sustainable fundraising mechanisms. Any NSA capacity-
building programme must be discussed with NSAs themselves, 
with other donors and with the relevant authorities, in order to 
create local capacity-building strategies that are cohercnl and 
adapted to the country. Capacity-building support lor NSAs 
will also assist in the identification of relevant partners in the 
consultation process and the implementation ol development 
policies. Further progress may be expected as a result of lessons 
learned and the integration ol best practices. The challenge is 
to progressively promote structured forms of dialogue. I he-
rolling nature of the programming exercise could facilitale such 
a process. ■ 
* Head of Unit "Development Policy, Coherence and Forward Studies", 
DC. Development, European Commission. 
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The explicit recognition of the 
role of civil society organisations 
and other non-state actors in the 
Cotonou Agreement was an 
important step forward for 
development. It legitimised what 
was theoretically understood -
that if the objective of 
development cooperation is to 
bring sustainable benefits to 
people, with an emphasis on 
those living in poverty, this can 
only be achieved when those 
people are themselves involved 
in the process. 
Simon Stocker* 
Historically, development assistance is littered with examples of 
programmes that have failed, pursued no doubt with the best of inten-
tions, but which were designed bv experts and which had little partic-
ipation of the "target" population. Not surprisingly, little ownership 
was felt and the ability to sustain such schemes was undermined. 
The concept of partnership is enshrined in the very title of the 
Cotonou Agreement, and has enormous implications tor the way 
in which the EU's cooperation with the ACP countries should be 
conducted. Ihe concepts of partnership and participation are 
clearly set out in the fundamental principles of the Agreement, 
including a commitment to the "equality of the partners and own-
ership of the development strategies". As the Agreement recognis-
es, this can only be achieved when the development strategies of a 
country are firmly rooted, and owned by the people ofthat coun-
try. Democratically elected national parliaments must play a cen-
tral role, but the dynamic and diversity of civil society organisa-
tions, representing the specific interests of their clearly defined 
constituencies, play an important complementan- role. 
Consultation or participation? 
So, where have we reached three years after the signing of the 
Agreement? One of the first tests for the involvement of non-state 
actors was the process to establish Country Strateg)' Papers for the 
EU's cooperation with each country. These are surely central to 
the concept of ownership. Different assessments have been made 
about the level of civil society participation in this process — both 
bv the official parties to the Agreement and by civil society organ-
isations themselves. At Eurostep we encouraged civil society actors 
in a number of ACP countries' to make their own assessment of 
civil society participation in their national process. The conclu-
sions were clear: while the basis for engaging civil society is being 
built, it is partial, and there is a long way to go. In too many 
instances participation is equated with consultation - which is not 
the same. These consultations were inadequately prepared, had lit-
tle consistency, and participation often seemed to be based on an 
arbitran- selection of civil society representation^ 
The process of engaging non-state actors needs to be open and 
transparent, predictable and inclusive. Participation can only be 
effective where there is adequate information provided on a contin-
uous basis, and where there is a regular process thai enables planned 
involvement by all stakeholders. It should be viewed as a means to 
strengthen visions and plans, which involves ongoing dialogue. 
Non-state actors and Cotonou: 
European civil society 
While it is always easiest to centralise these processes, there have to 
be the means to involve the interests of society and stakeholders 
from all pans of the country. Since the principal objective of the 
partnership is the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty, 
then representatives from these groups - and those sections of soci-
ety that are most excluded and marginal - need to be involved. They 
must be central stakeholders in a nation's development strategies. 
A learning period 
This will not necessarily be easy, and given the diverse nature 
of civil socien- it is inevitable that from time to time tensions will 
arise between different interest groups, and benveen civil society 
organisations and the official parties to the Partnership. 
Ultimately this can help ACP governments in their negotiations 
with the EU. through strengthening development sttategies and 
assuring real ownership. 
A dialogue has been initiated with the Joint ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers, involving civil society participation both from the ACP 
and Europe. The dialogue may be limited in its scope - an hour-
long session once a year with more than 110 people sitting round 
the table - but it provides a unique opportunity to project clear 
messages to both the EU and ACP members of the Council. The 
twice yearly meetings of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly also pro-
vide opportunities for ACP and European civil society to engage 
wirh Parliamentarians from both sides of the Agreement on issues 
relating to the implementation of the cooperation. While these 
opportunities tor dialogue at the global level of the Agreement are 
important, they cannot substitute tor vibrant participation region-
ally, nationally and locally. It is important to link the different 
levels and to develop a partnership of equals between civil society 
from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific with that in Europe. 
Role for European civil society 
For European civil society organisations, a primary role lies in 
Europe; promoting a fairer world, encouraging Europe's citizens to 
recognise that we ultimately have a common destiny with 
people all over the world. We have a role in holding our govern-
ments and elected representatives accountable, not only to the 
promises on which they have been elected, but also to the commit-
ments that they have made as part of the international community. 
We also strive to hold corporations that operate from our countries 
accountable for their social, ecological and ethical responsibilities -
wherever they operate, especially in developing countries. 
As European development NGOs, we work with civil society organ-
isation in other parts of the worid towards achieving goals that we can 
agree in common. Within the framework of ACP-EU cooperation, this 
means building societies where people can live in peace and security, 
have effective control of their own lives, enjoy their basic rights and a 
sustainable livelihood with respectful use of the earth's resources. 
In Brussels, Eurostep convenes the Cotonou Monitoring Group 
(CMG) which brings together a number of European NGOs. 
Primarily composed of Brussels-based NGO networks, the CMG 
aims to strengthen collaboration benveen European NGOs specif-
ically relating to EU-ACP cooperation. This covers many issues, 
including the trade negotiations on establishing Economic 
Partnership .Agreements ', and different sectoral policies. 
.An important counterpart is the ACP Civil Society Forum, 
which provides a framework tor ACP civil society engagement 
Partnership and participation - concepts set out in the fundamental principles 
of Cotonou - can only be achieved when the development strategies of a 
country are firmly rooted, and owned by the 
people of that country. 
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with Cotonou's institutions. Over the next few months, as 
CONCORD - the newly established confederation of European 
development and humanitarian NGOs - establishes itself, a 
Working Group on ACP-EU cooperation will be set up where the 
CMG will provide the core. The aim of this Working Group will 
be ro encourage awareness among European NGOs, particularly 
those trom the ten accession countries joining the IT' next year, 
of the specific provisions set out in the Cotonou Agreement. 
Ensuring a flow of information 
Ensuring that there is accessible information on AGP-EL' ciR>pcr-
ation is an important part of the partnership between European and 
ACP civil society. For this reason the European NGO networks, 
including Eurostep, helped found Euforie', an internet-based pönal 
tor information on EU development cooperation policy Euforie noi 
only provides a gateway to information and analysis on EU devel-
opment cooperarion wich rhe ACP and other developing regions. 
but also promotes discussion on key issues. A strategic aim is to 
encourage information and analysis from civil soeten- in developing 
countries, as this is often lacking in Europe. Another kev aim is 10 
make relevant information on EU cooperation more accessible to 
civil society organisations in ACP and other developing countries. 
Mid-term reviews - next test 
The next major test of the progressive involvement of civil society 
representatives in ACP-EU cooperation will be the mid-term reviews 
ot the countn' strategy papers. Preparations are already being made. 
and we understand thev will take place next year. We expect civil soci-
ety and other non-state actors to be involved in this process in .1 wav 
that reflects the "standards" ot participation - about which there 
seems to be some increasingly common understanding. We expect 
the plans, timetables and criteria on which the mid-term reviews are 
to be conducted to be openlv available well in advance of the process. 
In conclusion, a full and effective involvement of civil socien/ repre-
sentatives in EU-ACP cooperation is a critical and necessary pre-
condition to making a countns ownership ot its own development 
strategies more than mere rhetoric. This is in the interests ot all ol us 
and will be one more step in moving the EU-ACP partnership towards 
being one of equals. Clearly, the EU as the stronger panner will always 
be in a position of strength. That is why the EL' has a responsibility to 
recognise that the way it aas, and the policies it pursues, have profound 
implications, not onlv for the people ot F'uropc, but tor the global com-
munity. Therefore, it should be recognised that the current debates 
about the future role of Europe in the world should be of great inter-
est — and concern — for the governments and peoples ot A( V countries. 
It is a discussion in which the views ot people from all pans ot the 
world should be heard. It, as the EL emphasises, its cooperation with 
the ACP and other developing countries is based on the principle of 
pannership, then the ACP must be involved in these critical debates 
about the future role ot Europe in the world. ■ 
* Direct«*-. Enrastcp (Kumpcan N »Warily TmcanL·« KtjinJ hiriKipjtmn «it IV« »pic > is a network »Λ 
Eurijptanik-M-liipnK-nt .ViOvrt advocates changes m tumpes elevei««ρηκ-ηι ρ« gkk-sand 
pracrito: hast-d on the perspectives drawn fmm tliircl experiences of and attive inv« «Ivenierrt 
<Λits members and their partners in development m over I'm countries at η «ss the world 
1. Benin. Cameroon.The Dominican Republic.Tanzania and I ganda 
2. The five reports can he found at: 
Imp . vv vv w t« 1 -. «step ««ml <l - j 
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mation at lltlji ¿ www t-naw .«i, h ml 
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Founded on 30 January this 
year, CONCORD represents 
about 1,200 development and 
relief NGOs in Europe. Its 
membership is set to increase 
with the enlargement of the EU 
next year: national platforms of 
three accession countries (Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Malta) 
are already members of 
CONCORD, while the other 
seven are expected to join in 
the near future. Its president, 
Dutchman Frans Polman, has a 
long experience on the ground. 
lit; spoke to the Courier about 
the challenges and 
opportunities for European 
NGOs in the Cotonou 
Agreement, and more generally 
about the role of Northern 
NGOs in current development 
policy practices. 
Maurizio Carbone/Dorothy Morrissey 
Concord was founded in January 2003. 
What are its aims? What have been its main 
achievements in those six months? 
Concord has five founding principles: to ensure that EU 
member states meet their commitment to spend 0.7 per cent 
ot their GNP on development aid; to reformulate the role of 
Northern civil society towards rheir Southern partners; to 
renew rhe partnership with the European institutions; to elab-
orate mechanisms to improve the legitimacy, representation 
and quality of NGOs work; and to assure the continuation of 
European responsibility towards the South in the process of 
enlargement and reform. But it is very important to note that 
CONCORD is an organisation of the members, and the 
members should be involved in their political agenda, in their 
working groups and activities. The added value is that we have 
nvo groups: the national platforms, which have a national 
basis, and the networks, which have more experience in special 
sectors. CONCORD as a confederation is only six months 
old, but our members have on average 30 or 40 years experi-
ence. We share information, experiences, and capacities, and 
will use them to influence EU policy on development. The 
relationship with the institutions of the EU, with the 
Commission and especially DG Development, Europeaid and 
the Development Commissioner, has increased in a very short 
time. So we have started a serious, open, transparent dialogue 
on different matters, the rationalisation of the budget lines, the 
future ot the co-financing programme, the Convention etc. 
The Cotonou Agreement introduced the concept 
of participatory development, but it seems that 
the reference is mainly to Southern NGOs. 
Participatory development 
in the Cotonou Agreement refers to 
both Northern and Southern NGOs" 
Interview with Frans Polman, President of CONCORD, 
the European confederation of development and relief NGOs 
What was the reaction of European NGOs to that 
article? 
In the discussions we had with the ACP and EU thete has 
never been an indication that Article 6 of the Cotonou 
Agreement refers only to Southern NGOs. There are different 
roles in participatory development. Dialogue at the national 
ACP level largely involves ACP civil society but not exclusively, 
as European NGO offices in ACP countries have also been 
involved in such dialogue. Dialogue on ACP-EU cooperation is 
carried out also at a broader level such as in the ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly and in the ACP-EU Joint Council of 
Ministers. In these fora EU civil society is just as involved as ACP 
civil society'. There are also mechanisms in Brussels that bring 
both ACP and EU civil society together with ACP and EU state 
actors to discuss global ACP-EU cooperation. Our institutional 
interest as Northern NGOs is not to stay alive, but to help ACP 
civil society. We must never forget that behind the Southern 
NGOs there are people, and that we are working for them. 
One of the main innovations of the Cotonou 
Agreement concerns the consultation of non-state 
actors in drawing up the country's development 
strategy. The first evaluations of this involvement 
have given mixed results. What are the strengths 
and weaknesses of this model? 
No model is perfect and implementation takes time. We are 
aware that when this process started, all EU delegations on the 
ground were not equipped to implement it in full detail. Some 
factors interfered, such as the country's political situation, the 
state of organisation of civil society, the size of the delegation. 
Identifying and launching consultation processes with civil actors 
takes time. This explains why the evaluation of the process by a 
number of civil society actors (including joint ACP-EU collabo-
rations) had mixed results. However, the principle of consulration 
is good. Now, we hope that in countries where the Country 
Strategy Paper is still due, during the mid-term review and the 
next Country Strategy Papers the consultation process will be 
fully applied. 
Some say that Northern NGOs should move away 
from direct intervention at the operational level, or at 
least concentrate on a very small number of projects. 
Are they really ready to scale down? 
I do not think there will be much scaling down in a general 
sense. The very nature of development cooperation is "adapta-
tion". When a population is on a trend of self-sustainable devel-
opment, our job is done and we move out to focus on another 
area. This refocus may not necessarily result in scaling down, as 
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other areas to focus on require capacity as 
well. In some cases, scaling down might not 
be the right answer to the situation. When a 
humanitarian crisis strikes or in countries 
where civil society is weak, efforrs of all spe-
cialised actors are needed. However, most 
Northern NGOs are aware of their responsi-
bility, which in principle is temporary, until 
Southern NGOs take over. Bur this is not 
easy and will take time. This also means that 
the relationship between Norrhern NGOs 
and their Southern partners has to change. 
That's why, in our agenda, we have a review, 
a re-formulation of the relarionship between 
North and South. Apart from this assistance 
and advisory role in capacity building, there 
is increasingly a need for European NGOs to 
focus on the European public in order to 
raise awareness. Lobbying Northern govern-
ments and international institutions on the 
impact of their decisions and providing them 
with relevant information is also an impor-
tant role for Northern NGOs. 
From left to right, former Belgian State Secretary for Development Cooperation Eddy Boutmans, 
CONCORD president, Frans Polman, who also works for the Dutch organisation Cordald, and EU 
commissioner for development and humanitarian affairs Poul Nielson. 
Another major innovation of Cotonou concerns 
direct funding to Southern NGOs. Is this a threat or 
an opportunity for Northern NGOs? 
There is a misconception that direct funding for Southern 
NGOs would create direct competition with Norrhern NGOs for 
the same funds. This is not true. The fund that will be opened up 
to Southern NGOs is the EDF, which Northern NGOs to a large 
extent never had direct access to anyway. Therefore, there will be-
little competition. The only potential fricrion is benveen 
Sourhern governments and Southern civil society. Actually, 
Southern NGOs' access to EDF funds could facilitate joint 
Northern-Southern civil society collaboration. 
In fact, I am not so sure rhat Southern NGOs are able to cope with 
the eligibility criteria set by the Commission. This means that only 
big Southern NGOs will benefit from direct funding. Therefore, it is 
important for Northern NGOs to help civil society to get structured 
and to help smaller Southern NGOs build their capacities. 
Public support for foreign aid in Europe is still high. 
EU member states have committed to increase their 
volume of aid. The European Convention has just 
released a draft Constitutional Treaty. How do you 
see the future of EU development policy from your 
point of view? 
The work of the European Convention is broadly satisfactory. 
Poverty eradication has been reaffirmed as the main priority of 
EU development policy; coherence between policies affecting 
developing countries has been reinforced. Bur we have some con-
cerns about the link between development policy and the CFSP 
(Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the European 
Defence Policy. For CONCORD, development and humanitari-
an policies may not be used for military or security purposes. 
Furthermore, the abolishment of the Development Council and 
its integration into the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council is a negative sign. Aid to people in need is neither a tool 
nor a toy. Development issues are specific: they have purposes 
and objecrives of their own rhat don't accommodate easily with 
other external policies. We are also worried about the disposal ol 
DG Developmenr or the possibility ol having a "junior commis-
sioner' in charge of development. The same considerations apply 
to the development committee of the European Parliament. 
You have also been very vocal about including 
the principle of partnership in the scope of EU 
development policy. 
Injustice is the mother of tomorrow's insecurity and no army, 
no border can be resistant to deprived people. That's why we arc-
reaffirming that, more than security policies, we need aid poli-
cies! Our hope is that the principles ol the Cotonou Agreement 
will be plainly written into the coming Constitution and will 
apply to all developing countries. I hese principles are: partner-
ship with Southern acrors, ownership, empowerment and partic-
ipation of civil society in their own development. I he European 
Convention made clear during one of its plenary sessions that 
the EDF could be budgetised, which is a good thing. I his was 
by consensus but it has not been written; however it will be pro-
posed during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGG). Bui 
EDF money must be spent according to the principles of 
Cotonou that I just described. We hope thai lhe new 
Commission and Parliamenr will put this reality high on their 
agenda and in the Constitution and that they will lobby their 
own governments. It's not only a political responsibility; it is a 
humankind responsibility. At our level, we will encourage them, 
and publicise their actions or non-actions in that respect. ■ 
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Cooperation between the European 
Union and countries in the South 
has in the past been the preserve of 
governments. The Cotonou 
Agreement provides a remedy for 
this lacuna by establishing 
participation as a "fundamental 
principle". However, the 
participation process has not been 
institutionalised, the form it should 
take being left up to governments 
and the various development actors. 
In this article, Bibiane Mbaye 
Gahamanyi* looks at how this 
participatory process has developed 
in West Africa. 
Within the context of post-Lomé negotiations and in 
an attempt to influence the process and the resulrs of the negoti-
ations, AGP civil society organisations' embarked upon a series of 
initiatives involving the setting-up of strategic alliances, capacity 
building and the establishment of lobbying platforms. With the 
Cotonou Agreement, the role of non-state actors is no longer lim-
iteci to development projecr implementation, but it extends to 
the definition, implementation and evaluation of development 
programmes and strategies. It will also be associated with politi-
cal dialogue. All parties face challenges because of the novelty of 
the phenomenon, and the resulring lack of experience and expert-
ise, and, on occasion, the non-democratic nature of certain polit-
ical regimes. Other difficulties arise from the institutional weak-
ness of the ACP countries and the EU, faced as they are with the 
Cotonou Agreement's busy implementation schedule and the 
nature and diversity of non-state actors, and civil society in par-
ticular. 
Civil society participation 
Cotonou process in 
rica 
Civil society organisations realise that they need to take a 
proactive attitude if their participation is to be guaranteed. The 
straregy adopted includes, on the one hand, establishing and 
structuring frameworks for dialogue and, on rhe orher hand, gen-
erating knowledge and promoting the acquisition of analytical 
tools and skills within civil society. 
The national level 
The process of establishing a national platform and giving it a 
formal framework that represents all its components and is 
accepred by all sides is long and difficult, sometimes practically 
impossible. Civil society consists of a group of non-state actors 
represenring a number of sectors with different, and possibly 
divergent, interests. Such diversity is a valuable asset, but some-
times generates the difficulty the various parties have in organis-
ing, in a sustainable fashion, a coherent framework for collabora-
tion and dialogue, in choosing appropriate representatives and in 
adopting common positions. No one model fits all countries, and 
each one will identify and experiment with its own approach or 
its own path, depending on its social, economic and political 
context. 
The local level is the basis of any participation process. Civil 
society national platforms are made up of a wide range of organ-
isations (NGOs, trade unions, associations, youth organisations, 
women's organisations and other movements). Over the past four 
years these platforms have been set up in Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
The aim is to motivate all those involved to form a genuinelv 
The ACP Civil Society Forum 
The ACP Civil Society Forum originates from a meeting of more than 30 civil society organisations held in Entebbe, Uganda in 
October 1997. Seven NGOs were selected as representatives of the three ACP regions: the Caribbean Policy Development 
Centre (CPDC) from Barbados for the Caribbean; the Pacific Concerns Resources Centre from Fiji for the Pacific; CONGAC from 
Cameroon for Central Africa, Econews Africa from Kenya for Eastern Africa, Enda TM from Senegal and Third World Network 
from Ghana for West Africa, Mwengo from Zimbabwe for Southern Africa. 
The objectives of the Forum are to, inter alia: support and strengthen the participation of ACP civil society organisations in the 
ACP-EU development cooperation framework; provide a platform where ACP civil society organisations can not only share 
information, but also formulate common positions on issues relevant to ACP-EU cooperation; facilitate the dialogue between 
ACP civil society organisations and official ACP and EU institutions; promote the views and concerns of marginalised social 
groups in ACP countries. 
During a meeting in Brussels in July 2001 involving about 120 ACP civil society actors, representatives of European NGOs, ACP 
states, the European Commission and the ACP secretariat, a declaration and plan of action were adopted. ACP civil society 
organisations stated clearly that their interest was not only "simply seeking funding", but that they wanted to participate 
effectively in the programming exercise. Those organisations that were the focal point of the Forum were mandated to 
continue facilitating the establishment of national platforms, building CSO capacities in their regions, and further structuring 
the Forum as the global platform to promote CSO participation in the Cotonou process in general. MC 
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ACP civil society 
Civil society organisations in West Africa have taken into account the need to adopt a proactive 
attitude if their participation is to be guaranteed. This includes establishing national and regional 
frameworks for dialogue and, at the same time, generating knowledge and promoting the 
acquisition of the necessary analytical tools and skills to participate effectively in the programming 
phase. 
representative national movement and to create a framework for 
consultation and dialogue between civil society organisations 
(CSOs) themselves, and between them and the authoriries. 
Each national platform has a focal point (which may be an 
association of organisations or a committee composed of several 
organisations) responsible for coordinating its activities. Three 
particular cases have emerged in the structuring process: 
• In countries where there were no national platforms, the need 
to become organised in order to participate in the Cotonou 
Agreement has served as a launch pad for mobilising and organ-
ising CSOs into a federation. The platforms established in 
Guinea, Benin and Togo, for example, relate not only to the 
Cotonou Agreement, but also to all development-related frame-
works, including the World Summit on Sustainable-
Development, Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes and 
World Trade Organisation related issues. 
• In countries where a platform already existed (e.g., Burkina 
Faso and Mali), either a committee or an organisation within 
that platform was set up or appointed as a focal point in order 
to monitor implementation of the Cotonou Agreement on 
behalf of the national platform. 
• In some countries a thematic approach was promoted: in 
Ghana, for example, an agricultural workers' trade unions is in 
charge of coordinaring CSO activities and promoring dialogue 
with the authorities covering all aspects of trade. In this case 
also, the framework goes beyond just the Cotonou Agreement. 
Over the past four years national platforms have set up and 
implemented annual work programmes, conducted in partner-
ship with experts from civil society, national governments or state 
organisations. There has been a series of national consultations on 
participation in implementing the Cotonou Agreement. National 
seminars on the 
Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPA) have 
taken place in Guinea 
Conakry and Niger, and 
most recently in Benin 
and logo. 
The regional level 
'the West African 
platform ol civil society 
organisations is formed 
by all the national focal 
points and national 
committees. I he plat-
form secretariat is the 
responsibility of ENDA 
T.M. 
1 he principal activi-
ties of a regional platform are raising awareness 
of CSOs in the region, promoting CSO capaci-
ty building, planning annual national activities, 
political advocacy, dialogue with regional insti-
tutions, producing and disseminating informa-
tion, and acting as liaison with social movements and other actors 
involved in political dialogue at sub-regional level. For example, 
these activities include: 
• African (ministerial) consultation sessions on issues relating to 
the ACP-EU negotiations on renewal of the Lomé Convention, 
I his informal fringe meeting within the official negotiation 
process took place in Paris in 1999. The result was a document 
that was submitted to the regional meeting ol the African group 
as a prelude to the ACP-EU Council of Ministers. 
• Evaluation of platform activities. Each year the platform meets 
to evaluate the work accomplished during lhe year and to deal 
wirh srrategic planning and coordination. 
• Participation in consultations regarding the Regional Indicative-
Programme. 
• Participation in a preparatory regional seminar on ι he-
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in February 2003 in 
Abuja, Nigeria. The seminar's aims were: to share the results ol 
studies into the impact of the F.PAs on sub-regional economies; 
to review the first phase of the negotiations; and io update the 
plan of action adopted by ministers in Cotonou. 
• Participation in the preparatory ministerial meeting on the 
EPAs. Within the context of West African preparations for EPA 
negotiations with the EU, a meeting of experts from the 
Ministries of Irade and Finance was held in April in Accra, 
Ghana, followed by a West Africa-EU ministerial consultation 
meeting. 
Future prospects 
ACP civil society is active and involved in implementing the 
Cotonou Agreement, but its level of participation is still minimal. 
Despite the efforts of CSOs and positive initiatives on the part of 
institutions and certain ACP and EU countries, ('SO participation 
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in ( lotonou is still merely symbolic. According to information 
gathered during national and regional seminars, in the majority of 
West African countries, participation in the National Indicative 
and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPs and RIPs) has been 
unsatisfactory. Furthermore, participation in the first phase of the 
EPA negotiations is for the time being non-existent. 
Yet there are encouraging signs: the various actors, authorities 
and civil society are aware of rheir low level of involvement in 
programming and preparing trade negotiations. Consultation 
between non-state actors and governments is under way to 
improve participation during the forthcoming stages, in particu-
lar by setting tip thematic groups. 
Regional integration is a high-profile political and economic 
choice in West Africa. Furthermore, the Cotonou Agreement — 
ratified by all West African governments - is a great encourage-
ment for the negotiation of EPAs within regional groups. West 
Africa has already indicated that it would be willing to negotiate 
an FTA at the regional level through the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS). The negotiating mandate-
has already been granted and a negotiating structure set up. West 
Africa has already passed through all the procedural stages lead-
ing to EPA negotiations. 
The national platforms are stepping up their activities relating to 
capacity building and political dialogue in the run-up to the trade 
negotiations. A great deal of effort is still required on all sides to 
strengthen the various structuring processes in progress. However, 
given the timetable and the rapid pace of events, civil society's chal-
lenge now centres on the use that will be made of these, albeit 
imperfect, structures. A democratic debate on the EPAs needs to be 
encouraged and initiated; implementation of the NIPs and RIPs 
needs to be monitored; and parricipation in and monitoring of the 
trade negotiations needs to be guaranteed. Priority will now be 
given to the drafting and identification of national positions 
leading to region-wide positions and strategies. ■ 
* llihianc Mbaye (¡ahamanyi deals with civil society capacity building at environmental 
Development Action in tile Third World (ENDAT.M.),an NGO based in Daltar, Senegal. 
1. These are the following organisations: Carribcan: Windward Islands Farmers' Association 
(\\Ί.\ΤΛ>: Pacific: Pacific Concerns Resource Centre Inc. (PCRQ; Southern Africa: Mwelekeo 
wa N(,0(MWEN(.O); Central Africa: Congac; East Africa: Econews; West Africa: ENDAT.M. 
A major shift for Pacific non-state actors 
The Cotonou Agreement heralded a major shift in relations between Pacific non-state actors (NSAs) and their 
governments. This positive climate was never witnessed during the Lomé Convention, mostly due to the lack of 
information regarding ACP-EU agreements. Within the region, the opportunities available under the decentralised 
cooperation facility were virtually unknown to Pacific non-state actors. 
Tupou Vere and Peter Emberson* 
Pacific Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) had been advo-
cating for years to have access and participate in dialogue process-
es with their own governments on matters relaring to national 
development plans and strategies, budget formulation, develop-
ment assistance programmes and public policies. With the inclu-
sion of specific affirmative provisions for the participation of non-
state actors in the Cotonou Agreement, Pacific CSOs are begin-
ning to engage in ACP-EU dialogue processes that were earlier 
confined to government policy makers and officials. Pacific CSO 
representatives are now slowly being included in governmental 
delegations attending seminars conducted in the Pacific on the 
Cotonou Agreement and the Economic Partnership Agreements. 
Dialogue partners 
The inclusion of Pacific CSOs in ACP-EU processes should 
also be attributed to their increasing knowledge of the Cotonou 
provisions and their own advocacy efforts in requesting relevant 
governmental officials to include them as dialogue partners. The 
increasing awareness amongst Pacific CSOs of the Cotonou 
Agreement was made possible through workshops organised 
between March 2001 and July 2002 by the Pacific Concerns 
Resource Centre (PCRC) in the 13 Pacific ACP countries. 
The seminars and information sharing aimed at building the 
capacity of Pacific CSOs in implementing Cotonou in matters 
relating to programming, the Economic Partnership Agreements 
and the essential and fundamental elements of respect for human 
rights, democracy, upholding of law and good governance. A list 
of CSOs and NSAs in each country was drawn up, national 
follow-up actions formulated and a national CSO identified that 
would act as the secretariat for CSOs' and/or NSAs' collective 
input into ACP-EU governmental processes. 
In all the seminars, participants unanimously decided to estab-
lish national platforms that would regularly engage governments 
and the European Commission on matters such as the Country 
Support Strategy, the National Indicative Programmes, the 
Economic Partnership Agreements and political matters of 
human rights and so forth. At the regional intergovernmental 
level, PCRC and the Pacific Island Association of NGOs 
(PIANGO) are invited to participate in the Pacific Island Forum 
Secretariat Working Groups on Human Resource Development 
and Private Sector, Investment and Tourism for the 9th European 
Development Fund. 
Challenges ahead 
Despite the promises of provisions for CSOs/NSAs engagement 
in ACP-EU dialogue processes, the challenges ahead include: 
• Governmental institutions are still slow in creating policies and 
procedures that would institutionalise the participation of CSOs 
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and other NSAs. National CSOs/NSAs and regional CSO plat-
forms' ability and chances of accessing resources either from the 
National or the Regional Indicative Programme are convoluted. 
• CSOs are challenged with questions of legitimacy when they 
wish to dialogue further with governmental institutions or are 
not given much time to prepare their positions. In some coun-
tries, CSOs are not invited to make their inputs. On trade and 
economic matters (Economic Partnership Arrangements), the 
few Pacific CSOs that have a critical perspective on world trade-
compatible arrangemenrs are not involved in national and 
regional meerings organised by governments. 
• CSOs lack personnel and resources to effectively analyse pro-
posed development assistance programmes, multilateral trading 
systems and arrangements; to conduct their own research and 
rake rheir findings to the dialogue process; to acquire more-
knowledge of public sector planning and decision making 
processes and negotiation skills with relevant officials. 
The empowerment process of informing Pacific peoples about the 
mechanisms within Cotonou, though gradual, is well and truly on its 
way with the ongoing seminars and training processes. The stage is 
now set for rhe provisions regarding CSOs/NSAs engagement to be 
"actioned out" through serious dialogue and practical implementa-
tion of the commitments made in the Agreement. But for this to 
work governments have to recognise the unique contribution every 
CSO has to make, that they represent a mosaic of views and the 
interests of different groups in socien·: the norm - which is incorrect -
is to group them all into a homogenous unit. As each CSO/NSAs 
views and experiences are different but equally important, it is essen-
tial that all parties be considered, because when ACP and EU gov-
ernments are in dialogue over poverty eradication measures, a holis-
tic representation from the grassroots level will be accounted for. ■ 
* Respectively Assistant Director Sustainable Human Development antl Assistant Director 
and Editor of the Pacific News Hulletin at the Pacific Concerns Resource Centre 
(PCRQ.a Pacific NGO based in Suva. Fiji Islands. 
1 These workshops were co-financed h\ the European Commission. K (.(> in the 
Netherlands. Bread lor the World in («ermany. the Commonwealth Foundation in 
London and the French Catholic Committee «\gainst Hunger and Development (CCFD). 
For participation to work, governments have to recognise the unique contribution 
that every civil society organisation has to make, that they represent a mosaic of 
views and the interests of different groups in society. 
NGOs in the Caribbean: 
aspiring to a fuller role in public life 
Elected leaders in the Caribbean, says Cecilia Babb*, are ambivalent about the role of ordinary people in public life. On the 
one hand they call for self-reliance and initiative from their constituents. At the same time they often resist the 
involvement of "non-state" organisations in decision-making processes. In this article she looks at how the aspirations of 
Caribbean people for a genuinely participatory role in the public affairs of their region are, or are not, being met. 
In 1997, Caribbean political leaders adopted the CARICOM 
Charter of Civil Society - an agreement which sets out the role of 
all the social partners in the public affairs of the region and provides 
a framework for genuinely participaton' democracy. Within this 
Charrer each state commits to best practices in good governance 
and to fostering the appropriate environment for the exercise of 
responsible citizenship. The spirit of the Charter is consonant with 
Chapter 2 of the Cotonou Agreement, which recognises the com-
plementary role of non-state actors in the development process. 
Reluctance to consult 
NGOs are particularly eager to embrace the opporrunities for 
partnering governments in rhe development of the region offered 
to them through rhe framework of the Charrer of Civil Society 
and the provisions of Cotonou. Having agitated for recognition 
as social partners in development since 1991, NGOs are respon-
sive to any gesture by their governments that might be construed 
as an invitation to work with them. 
CARIFORUM ' for its part has been inviting the social partners 
and non-state bodies to meetings on a yearly basis silice 1996. 
However, these meetings remain at the level ol information shar-
ing and have not moved to the stage of consultation. Indeed, the 
manner in which invitations are extended and the conduct ol the 
meetings themselves suggests that CARI1-ORUM does not view 
NGOs as more than observers. NGOs have never been able to put 
items on the agenda and their inputs at the meetings are persist-
ently resisted. Invitations are usually late, and documentation often 
arrives later than the invitation, derailing the NGO principal ol 
consulting with members so as to advance truly representative 
views and positions. T his reflects, at worst, a lack of real commit-
ment to partner NGOs in the development process, and, at best, a 
lack of understanding and skill in participatory processes. 
As for the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement, the experiences 
of NGOs wirh the National Indicative Programmes have been even 
worse. The Technical Unit of CARIFORUM can be credited with 
regularly inviting civil society to meetings. But the National 
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comparative advantage. In Jamaica, for example, communities are being empowered to control and manage their water resources 
ners at no real cost to the 
CARICOM states, bearing 
in mind that the private sec-
tor already has its own 
direct line of access to 
resources. NGOs would be 
able to carry out a large 
number of social develop-
ment programmes that the 
departments of government 
are hard pressed ro under-
take and in which NGOs 
have a comparative advan-
tage. 
It is instructive that 
Cuba, which was seeking 
accession to Cotonou and 
which does not boast the 
high ideals of democratic 
Authorising Officers (NAOs) in most CARICOM countries are 
invisible. The elaboration of the Country Strategy Papers is 
shrouded in secrecy instead of being the open, consultative and 
participatory process envisaged in the Cotonou Agreement. 
Failure to tackle the problems 
While Caribbean NGOs take their governments and public 
officers to task, they also question the commitment of the 
European Commission to the principles of partnership 
enshrined in ACP-EU cooperation agreements. The former 
"decentralised cooperarion" was not a success. Organisations that 
received decentralised cooperation project funds were almost 
crippled under the weight of administering these projects. Nor 
have the provisions for non-state actors under the Cotonou 
Agreement brought any better results so far. The problem of 
unused resources under the previous Lomé Convention was well 
recognised, but there has been little apparent effort to rectify the 
difficulties of access from the EU end. 
By comparison, European NGOs have an integral role in the 
Cotonou Agreement and easy access to technical capacity build-
ing and financial resources. As a result, they are convening 
meetings and doing research in the Caribbean that could have 
been clone by non-state bodies from the region if they had 
access to the resources. European NGOs are taking on roles in 
relation to Caribbean civil society that ought properly to be led 
by Caribbean governments with whom local NGOs are eager to 
work. Even the co-financing facility, the best feature of rhe 
cooperation agreement for Caribbean NGOs, is a relationship 
yielding benefits in a ratio of 60/40 in favour of European 
NGOs. 
Benefits to both sides 
Unused resources from the 7th and 8th EDFs and the resources 
of the 9th EDF allocated to non-state actors under Cotonou can 
be used to fulfil all the governments' commitments to the part-
governance, has since 1997 
consistently facilitated 
access to co-financing specifically for the work of NGOs. 
Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and 
Tobago, are beginning to show an appreciation of what is at stake. 
In Jamaica communities are being empowered to control and 
manage their water resources. The multi-sectoral Jamaica Trade 
Adjustment Team is a step in the right direction as is Trinidad's 
Change Management Unit for Poverty Eradication and Equity 
Building. A few NGOs in St Vincent are now discussing projects 
with the National Authorising Officer. 
Governments have by and large missed the opportunity to advance 
the spirit of the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society and the letter of 
the Cotonou Agreement on several counts. If resources continue to 
be inaccessible within the Cotonou Regional and National Indicative 
Programmes, officers cannot fulfil the provisions relating to struc-
tured partnerships with NGOs in their countries and regions. 
The CPDC has produced a Participation Guide for Polity Makers 
(2002) and disrributed this widely across the region. The lack of 
capacity in analysis, planning, project management and related skills 
which NAOs admitted at their recent meeting in Brussels, could be 
easily overcome by closer collaboration with groups that have con-
siderable experience of doing much with few resources. 
Caribbean NGOs are always interested in raising rheir ability to 
carry out their developmental role, and remain willing to work in 
partnership with their national governments for the good of socie-
ty. It is not too late for civil society to be empowered to fulfil its 
social development role; this would enable marginalised sectors, 
which might otherwise be deprived of essential help, to get more 
immediate attention for their needs. It is not too late for valuable 
partnerships to be forged among the social partners and for a new 
pool of expertise and skills to be acquired; models of participation 
could be tested; and governments could win public confidence and 
praise for the quality of governance in the region. ■ 
* Deputy Coordinator at the Caribbean Policy Development Centre in Barbados. 
1. The Caribbean Forum consists of CARICOM, the Dominican Republic and. since June 
2001. Cuba. 
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Trade Unions are stakeholders of 
development: this is an often 
ignored and sometimes disputed 
fact, surely as a result of 
ignorance of present social 
realities and the social history of 
the ACP States. 
In this article, Gérard Fonteneau* 
calls for stronger participation 
and consultation of trade union 
actors in the implementation of 
the Cotonou Agreement. 
The European and international trade union move-
ment has since 1957 always attached great importance to the 
establishment of equitable cooperation relations between the ACP 
countries and the EU. Throughout the years, it drew attention to 
the gap between speeches and practice. At each renewal of the 
Yaounde and Lomé Conventions, the contracting parties seemed 
to have heard these criricisms and were making positive amend-
ments to the text. In general, the Lomé Conventions had positive 
effects in several fields: infrastructure, equipment, various devel-
opments, and training. Through Srabex and Sysmin, the disas-
trous consequences of periods of low prices for raw materials were 
mitigated for producers and the countries concerned. However, 
there was a great lack of effectiveness and a significant disparity 
between the amounts allocated and the results, even if would be-
more accurate to nuance this on the basis of countries and regions. 
Mixed feelings about Cotonou 
The Cotonou Agreement was received with mixed feelings with-
in the trade union movement. In the presentation of the trade-
union dossier on the analysis and utilisation of the Cotonou 
Agreement published in September 2000, the Secretary-Generals 
of the ETUC, ICFTU and the WCL made the following observa-
tion: "The trade union movement is satisfied with several provi-
sions of the new agreemenr, on condition that they are really imple-
mented, in particular; the involvement of the stakeholders, includ-
ing unions, in all the activities and in all the fields of cooperation; 
explicit reference to the fundamental rights of the ILO, as essential 
components of the validin- of the cooperation, but also, as 
a criteria to be observed in trade cooperation; social objec-
tives and sustainable development; transparency of rhe pro-
grammes; policy dialogue based on similar commitments 
made by the 15 States of the Union and the 71 ACP coun-
tries in the international institutions (UNO, ILO, WHO, 
UNESCO). On the contrary, international and European 
trade unionism is concerned about the ambiguities and 
lapses of this Agreement, in particular: the free trade aspects 
often seem to supercede the objectives and practices of 
cooperation; though made flexible and submirted for eval-
uations, rhe integration of the ACP States into global trade 
Employment produces socially beneficial 
goods and services and generates income; the 
trade unions believe that a specific 
programme should be created for it 
Trade unions 
are development stakeholders! 
poses serious risks to the economic and social development capa-
bilities ot these States; neglect ot priority problems such as debt 
and structural adjustment; also, considering past experience, seri-
ous doubts remain on the determination and capacity of the con-
tracting parties to apply the social objectives as well as the partici-
pative methods ". 
Progress since Cotonou 
Two years after the signing and one year after the conclusions of 
the national programming, it is difficult to conduct the first evalu-
ation of the implementation, especially since the information is 
partial and often contradictory. One can however venture some 
observations. Development strategies embrace really relevant 
objectives, but then the contracting parties are currently unable to 
take stock of the social aspects of the programming. Given the cat-
astrophic results in the social domain of the Lomé Conventions, it 
is normal to be doubtful. An indication; the lack of a real employ-
ment promotion policy. On several occasions during the negotia-
tions and just before the finalisation, the trade union movement 
stressed to the negotiators that employment, the strategic objective, 
produces socially beneficial goods and services, generares income, 
and purchasing power for that matter, and that a specific" pro-
gramme should be created for it in collaboration with the "Decent 
employment" programme ot rhe ILO. 
The participation of non-governmental stakeholders is facing seri-
ous problems of implementation. It is an indispensable but ambitious 
objective whose implementation will have to be gradual. Given that 
the contracting parties have no participative culture and have to deal 
wirh organisarions that, until recently, they considered subversive. 
Unsatisfactory participation 
In 2002, the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) seni a 
questionnaire to its affiliates in some of the ACP countries where 
the European Commission Direcrorare General for Development 
had consulted civil society, to evaluate the elice live participation 
in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. I he first con-
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launching of small-scale income-generating activities. 
sulfation took place in May 2002; the second one in December 
2002. Answers were far from encouraging: 
• the consultation of the trade union actors on the development and 
adoption ol the National Indicative Programme (NIP) is not vety 
systematic and almost insignificant; more generally, the trade union 
contacts with the on-the-spot leaders (national officials and head of 
the European delegation) are not frequent and profound enough; 
• the trade unions wish to strengthen their role as actors of devel-
opment and social partners with a view to a proper implemen-
tai ion of the Agreement, but the representatives of the European 
Commission seem to consider that this matter is not part of the 
funding priorities; 
• the trade unions demand a more prominenr role for social 
activities consolidating the human factor in the NIP: literacy 
campaigns and basic education, vocational training for those 
excluded from the school system, launching of small-scale 
income-generaring activities for youths and women in the 
informal sector, development of individual handicraft projects 
and community interest projects. 
Sustainable development, without real content or 
efficient resources? 
The European Union's idea of development beyond speeches, 
has shifted to the traditional options of neo-liberalism and recourse 
to the private sector, "economic growth fuels social progress" and 
"trade, a development tool', etc. These assertions would be correcr 
if a strict supervision of rhe precise rules could compel the market 
to be a factor of social progress and a tool for sustainable develop-
ment; but market forces defy all social and tax limitations and, 
through soft-law, contribute to the spread of private law to the 
detriment of public law. 
Mobilised, by choice or constraint, to the options of globalised 
capitalism, the authorities know that real cooperation between 
partners of equal knowledge and power, as well as real sustainable-
development policies are impossible at the moment, because they 
come up against too many economic, financial and commercial 
interests, strategies ot multi-national conglomerates and the 
power positions of the economic and political giants. ■ 
* Coordinator of the Cotonou EU-ACPTrade Union (¡roup, an outcome of the European 
Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC), the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (icri'l ) and the World Confederation of Labour (WCL). each of which has 
affiliated national organisations in all the ACP States. 
The ACP Business Forum: 
a platform to enhance private sector capacities and 
development 
At the beginning of the negotiations for a successor agreement to Lomé IV, business representatives from different ACP 
regions created an ACP Business Forum. This Forum aims to become a network of key ACP private sector actors, and an 
effective platform for improved public-private sector dialogue and to build common positions and proposals leading to the 
enhancement of private sector capacities and development through ACP-EU cooperation. 
Milagros Puello* 
The Libreville Declaration of the ACP Heads of State and 
Government (November 1997) recognised the need for institu-
tional support to the ACP private sector. It called for "the estab-
lishment of an ACP-EU business forum of ACP and EU business 
institutions and enterprises". Building on this, a group of ACP 
private sector actors started an informal, bottom-up process 
aimed at preparing the ground for the creation of an ACP 
Business Forum. 
In a first meeting in May 1998, the group agreed that existing 
ACP private sector networks did not truly and effectively repre-
sent ACP business interests. They therefore articulated an ACP 
private sector memoradum with priority actions for the negotia-
tion process. They also defined the "rules of the game" for the 
gradual institutionalisation of the Forum aiming to avoid the cre-
ation of a heavy, non-representative, non-viable ACP private sec-
tor institution that would depend on donor funding. A second 
meeting was convened in September 1998 in Brussels. The main 
outcome was the formal launching of the ACP Business Forum 
as a light and effective network that could offer an added-value 
compared to existing ACP private sector institutions. 
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other non-state actors 
Benin, employees with bundles of cotton 
The objectives of the ACP Business Forum are: to promote link-
ages and collaboration among ACP private sector actors and their 
EU business partners; to strengthen the overall capacity of ACT pri-
vate sector actors to effectively participate in the formulation and 
implementation of ACP-EU cooperarion at national, sub-regional, 
regional and global levels; to build a new public-private partnership 
with ACP governments and with the EU, based on dialogue, a 
quest for complementary acrion and mutual accountability. 
The primary target group of the ACP Business Forum is pri-
vate sector representative bodies. The Forum wants to reach out 
to these constituencies, improving information and communica-
tion flows, creating opportunities for sharing experiences and 
defining common interests. However, the promotion of ACP pri-
vate sector linkages is nor an end in itself. It is a means to ensure 
the involvement and participation of ACP private sector actors in 
future ACP-EU cooperation at different levels. This, in turn, will 
help to build new public-private partnerships. 
A major role that the ACP Business Forum seeks to play is dis-
semination of information. At present, ACP private sector actors 
are poorly informed on the overall Cotonou framework, its strate-
gic imporrance, policies, mechanisms and instruments, including 
the special facilities available to privare secror actors. It is equally 
difficult for them to obtain reliable and up-to-date information on 
the current process of ACP-EU cooperation and interaction, the 
issues at stake at a particular point in time, the different policy 
positions and future opportunities for lobbying. This is parricu-
larly disturbing, as rhe Cotonou Agreement contains several dis-
positions favourable to private sector development. 
For progress to be achieved, the ACP private sector needs insti-
tutional development. With a few notable exceptions, the ACP 
private sector is not ready to enter into balanced partnererships 
with ACP authorities at different levels, nor to make the best use 
of the cooperation outlined in the Cotonou Agreement. 
Information flows at national, regional and global levels are still 
deficient. On the other hand, there are very few structured chan-
nels for communication and dialogue between ACP and EU 
business people. In many ACP countries, privare sector organisa-
tions confront problems of legitimacy, funding and capacity. 
The ACP Business Forum does not intend to duplicate the work 
carried out by existing ACP private sector organisations. Its aim is to 
complement existing efforts by producing a clear addcd-value. I lie-
Forum believes that its "niche" and comparative advantage lie in the 
promotion of ACP private sector interests in overall ACP-EU coop-
eration. The choice for a bottom-up approach - whereby member 
organisations themselves define and execute the mandate- and work-
plan of the Forum - may help to achieve such added-value. 
The way forward 
I he operation of the ACP Business Forum is meant lo be an 
ongoing, all-inclusive and dynamic process. This inevitably 
implies the choice for a lean, participatory and decentralised 
institutional framework that can be adapted over time as new 
members join. I he Forum will meet in September to review the 
formalisation of its structures, including duly-approved rules; ι he-
consolidation of an organisational set-up largely based on repre-
sentation of the various ACP regions; the operationalisation of 
the ACP and ACP-EU Action Plans adopted in May 2002 with 
a view to the adoption of a Work Programme; and the adoption 
of an Action Plan, including a Brussels-based Secretarial; the 
adoption of inputs on the WTO and EPA negotiations, all lead-
ing to the achievement of a competent, dynamic and fully repre-
sentative body of the ACP private sector and to a better use ol 
ACP-EU cooperation for boosting private sector development as 
a catalyst for economic growth and poverty reduction in A( 'V 
countries. ■ 
* President of the ACP Business Forum. 
In contrast to the Lomé Conventions, the Cotonou Agreement emphasises the importance of local governments in promoting economic 
and social development in ACP countries. Emerging as a distinct actor from central governments as a result of the decentralisation process 
in the developing world, local governments of many ACP countries are still fragile institutions, facing problems of capacity and lack of funds. 
Following the example of the Civil Society and the Business Forums, an ACP Local Government Platform was set up in 1999. The aim of 
the Platform is to raise the profile of ACP local governments within the EU and to build a network that could help them to be aware of, 
receive information on and access EU development funds, and play a role in ACP-EU development cooperation strategies. 
However, if civil society, and in a minor way, the private sector, have been influential in the programming exercise, local governments have not 
been much involved. This is probably a consequence of the ambiguity of their status. The Cotonou Agreement identifies local governments 
among the actors to be involved in the programming phase; yet, they are not often considered "non-state" actors, but as part of central 
government. For this reason, the Platform is an essential element to facilitate dialogue and provide services to local authorities which would 
allow them to play the complementary role in promoting development in ACP countries as established by the Cotonou Agreement. MC 
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The Couleur Café Festival, Brussels 
Culture: hand-in-hand 
with solidarity and development 
From 27 to 29 June 2003, the organisers of the 14th Couleur Café festival 
brought together 65,000 people of 95 different nationalities, plus 350 
volunteers on a 55,000 m
2 site in the European capital. 
Eyoum Ngangué 
Over the three days of the event, a former indus-
trial site in Brussels became a melting pot of sounds, smells 
and images from the four corners of the world. Credit is due 
to the organisers, who rook a Theoretically inhospitable loca-
tion and transformed it into an oasis of fun and festivity for 
this highly colourful annual celebration. Four podiums were 
erected to accommodate jazz bands and other music groups. 
One souk, five bars and a gasrronomic alley baptised "The 
road to good food" completed the décor. In rhe aprly named 
"Place de l'IndépenDanse" world rhythms vied with one 
another to be heard. Couleur Café was not found wanting 
by the crowds that came to drink, eat, dance and learn... 
Element: earth 
Earth was the theme chosen for the Cool Art Café exhibi-
tion, an area given over ro the plastic arts. Among the pottery 
and ant-hills were photographs celebrating architecture based 
simply on earth. Below a huge painting of the Djenné 
mosque in Mali, people with their hands full of mud busied 
themselves building an earth hut. The head of this workshop, 
Belgian architect Sophie Brochart, told us; "We have here 
Photo N.ith,ihe Nizt'lle/Couleur Café 2003 
two African earth huts. One is built using Belgian tech-
niques; a wooden frame with straw packing, and the other, 
under construction, is being built according to methods 
employed in West Africa, using earth bricks dried by the sun. 
Africans sometimes tend to take a derogatory view of houses 
made of earth, building instead with concrete and cement. 
Paradoxically, at the same time in Belgium there is a resur-
gence of interest in using earth in constructions. It is impor-
tant that Africans are aware of this — earth is a noble materi-
al, and it is so much more advantageous for them as a build-
ing material: it is less expensive, it keeps air cool more effi-
ciently, and its use means getting the benefit of local know-
how and construcrion techniques". All around her, the area 
is a hive of activity as people ask questions, or make their 
own small contribution to the building by laying a brick. 
Children, who were particularly attracted by the fun, con-
structive, educational aspect of the workshop, launched 
themselves wholeheartedly into the exercise, each leaving 
their mark on the roughcast walls: a drawing here, a daub of 
ochre there. Everyone was mucking in so as to get the hut 
built as quickly as possible. Interaction was an overriding 
theme, centred around 
the element earth. 
A few metres on, 80 
craftsmen were exhibit-
ing products from coun-
tries in the South. One 
such exhibitor, Senega-
lese Moussa Kane, was 
inviting curious onlook-
ers to try their hand at 
his art. His technique, 
batik, originated in 
India, "but Africans 
made it their own for 
decorating loincloths. 
Thousands of women in 
the countries of the 
Sahel earn money from 
batik, making them 
financially independ-
ent". In front of him, 
Inge, a young Belgian, 
was absorbed in sketch-
ing a lizard on a remnant 
of fabric. Moussa 
explained: "You create a 
design in wax to produce 
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many organisations set up stands to raise 
public awareness on some major issues. 
The European Commission's stand was 
arranged as a classroom in an African 
village, complete with six school benches, 
a blackboard, a cabinet and some 
engravings on the walls. 
^"»W 
European Commission 
protected areas. Then you make up a vat of dye, with natu-
ral or industrial pigments, in which to dip the cloth, which 
is then rinsed and dried. These days, more and more 
Europeans are seeking African fabrics for their clothing, ful-
filling one of the objectives of the festival, which is to facil-
itate intermixing and intercultural exchanges". 
Contact and awareness 
Moussa Kane's view is shared by fellow Senegalese Mame 
Fatou Diakhaté, a 15 year-old DJ for Faggaru FM, a radio 
station in Dakar, who was invited to the festival by RTBF '. 
She told us, "We are a radio station by children for chil-
dren. Our presence here allows us to do some reporting and 
make contact with potential future partners". 
Amidst this colourful, festive atmosphere, young people 
from the association Tam-Tam Sida
: were distributing con-
doms, reminding festival-goers that AIDS is still rife. Several 
organisations (Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Unicef) 
had set up stands to raise public awareness on some major 
issues, including violence towards women in Kenya, pollution 
and the future of rhe world's children. We visited the stand of 
SOS-Faim, a Belgian association which has been taking part in 
the festival since 1998. The association's representative, Jacques 
Grodent, cast his mind back: "In that year, together with sev-
eral other organisations, we set up the Lomé Village, a forum 
within the festival for discussion and exchanges of information 
on the EU-ACP Convention." As for 2003, "we are offering an 
area where visitors to the festival can meet and discuss agricul-
ture in countries in the South. We suggest that they find out 
more about the native social and economic context for artists 
from the South whose talent they admire. We use culture as a 
stepping stone towards a more in-depth knowledge of the lives 
of people in Southern countries: the causes of underdevelop-
ment, unfair trade, etc. People are pretty amazed at the infor-
mation we provide on the issue of aid for farmers in the North, 
and the problem of the credit system that penalises farmers in 
developing countries. The public can then betrer understand 
the problems facing rural Africans". On SOS-Faim's stand, vol-
unteers were showing visitors foodstuffs from Africa, such as 
cassava and peanuts, which they could taste. For SOS-Faim, 
the festival is a sort of recruitment fair. "People leave their 
address so they can receive more information. Later, some may 
decide to become volunteers for us. But rhe main question we 
ask on this stand is: 'What can we do?'." 
All this mental exercise was going on in the midst of a carni-
val-like hullabaloo. Manu Dibango, Sauf Keita, Jimmy Cliff, the 
Coulibaly Brothers, Zaiko Langa Langa... big show-biz names 
alternated on stage with small groups, brass bands and other 
musical curiosities. As Michel Durieux, who was responsible for 
the festival's communication unit, explained: "Music is the 
cradle of Couleur Café, the element that brings everyone 
together to dance, laugh, and interact with one another". 
Getting away from gloom and doom 
Set a little apart from this general racket was an unusual 
stand set up by the European Commission on the initiative of 
DG Dev
 
l. It was arranged as a classroom in an African village, 
complete with six school benches, a blackboard, a cabinet and 
some engravings on the walls. Relaxed and casual, EU offi-
cials were distributing literature: for children, a bubble blow-
er ' and the "Mathias and Amadou" ' book, while adults 
received the accompanying teaching manual", together with 
other irems relating to EU polity' in development matters. A 
few visitors got into the spirir of things, pretending to be 
pupils or teachers. For example, taking the role of schoolmas-
ter, wirh chalk in hand, Cameroonian Roger Zé gave his view-
point on North-Sourh relations. Fermina, from Equatorial 
Guinea, said she was delighted with it all but wished the 
Commission's stand had got a more central position in the 
festival. On this subject, the stand's manager Georges 
Eliopolis explained, "Our aim in raking parr in this event is 
threefold: we wan ι to attraci attention, incite interest in whai 
we do and induce people to visit our website." Since 1 July, 
visitors to the website have been treated to photos taken on 
the stand by Raymond Dakoua, from Côte d'Ivoire. 
When asked about the Commission's role in cultural 
events of this kind, Leonidas Antonakopoulos, head of DG 
Dev's communication and information unit, said "Couleur 
Café helps to promote culture in developing countries, and 
this is why we are here, to pass on the message and raise-
awareness among young people. Depicting the developing 
world in terms of artistic and musical creation means tak-
ing a very uplifting and dynamic tone, getting away from 
the morbid aspect many would attribute to it..." 
This sentiment was echoed by Jean-Jacques Grodent, 
who says that "any development project that does not take-
account of the cultural aspects and desires of the people is 
doomed to failure". 
Raymond Dakoua who, as a photographer, performed his 
own analysis of the festival, gets the last word: "Couleur Cafe-
shows that differences are meant to be complementary". ■ 
1. Radio Télévision Helge tranci «ph« «ne (Itelgian trench-language public broadcaster) 
2. Belgian association for the prevention of AIDS, focusing on migrant popula-
tions and refugees. It also pmvides psychosocial help for those Infected. 
3.Tlie European Commission's Development Directorate-General. 
4. Λ gimmick produced by the Commission. The bubble blower tube bears the 
caption 'Hubbies to awaken you... to development cooperation'. 
5. Mathias anti Amadou.Awakening to Development Cooperation, published in 
May 201)3 be the European Commission for children in schools in Member 
States of the EC. 
6. Mathias Amadou. Teaching Manual on the European Union's Community Policy 
on Development Cooperation. European Commission DE 1 IS. May 2003. 
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Burundi 
©Crispin Huglics/P.inos Pictures 
A small, landlocked country in the middle of the Great Lakes region, Burundi is one of the 
continent's most densely populated nations. The landscape is characterised by hills and valleys, 
bound in the west by Lake Tanganyika and split by the Nile and Congo basins. 
The country has experienced periods of intense turbulence since independence in 1962, marked by 
cyclical ethnic conflicts between the different groups. The current wave of violence goes back to 
1993. But hope for peace was revived with the Arusha Agreement, signed in 2000. The Arusha peace 
process envisages the division of power between the two major groups in the country, the Hutus 
and the Tutsi. The ending of the international sanctions and the resumption of international aid 
gave a kickstart to a completely lifeless economy. In April this year. President Domitien Ndayizeye 
succeeded Pierre Buyoya, in accordance with the compromise foreseen in the Arusha Agreement on 
the transitional government. The transition took place calmly, but violence erupted a few weeks 
later, and the capital, Bujumbura, was the theatre of intense fighting. In this extremely volatile 
context, EU-Burundi cooperation concentrates primarily on humanitarian aid, socio-economic 
rehabilitation and support for the peace process. In other words, economic development and 
institutional support as a route to peace. 
Report and photos (unless otherwise indicated): François Lefèbvre 
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The hope and anticipation that accompanied the signing of the Arusha Agreement 
appear to be turning to scepticism on the part of observers and resignation for much 
of Burundi's population. For 10 years, conflict bathed Burundi in blood, seemingly 
having its own dynamic irrespective of the efforts of negotiators and the suffering of 
its citizens. The spectre of a Rwanda-style situation haunts the country. Economic 
development, monitoring of the peace process and support for civil society are still 
the only effective weapons against the military option. 
July 2003 saw Bujumbura in turmoil once again. Clashes 
in the capital's southern districts and bombardment of the city 
centre resulted in 200 civil, militar)' and rebel casualties, with 
tens or thousands of the country's inhabitants fleeing the combat 
zones. Bujumbura was being attacked by a National Liberation 
Front (FNL) faction led by Agathon Rwasa, probably joined bv 
members of the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD), 
led by Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza. Although an expected prelude-
to any session of negotiations, this new upsurge in violence nev-
ertheless surprised everyone - the rebels' strength had been 
underesrimared and for several days they mounted an offensive 
against the country's nerve centre. Yet, in rural areas, far from 
the gaze of the media, lives are lost in recurrent clashes. 
A small country in the Great Lakes region, since independ-
ence in 1962 Burundi has experienced almost permanent insta-
bility. The latest wave of violence dates back to 1993, when the 
Tutsi-minorirv-dominated army fomented a coup d'érat. The 
Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated, an act that 
unleashed a wave of inter-ethnic
; massacres and threw Burundi 
into civil war and chaos. In 1996, another coup d'érat put for-
mer Tutsi President Pierre Buyoya back in power. The interna-
tional community's reaction was swift, and sanctions were 
immediately implemented. 
Hope and disappointment 
With the start of peace negotiations in 1999 came a pro-
gressive lifting of the freeze on international aid. The peace-
negotiations were fraught with difficulties, but nevertheless 
led in August 2000 to the signing of the Arusha Agreement. 
The process brought together all political parties and ended 
with an — albeit minimal — political consensus that made pro-
vision for power to be shared between Burundi's two princi-
pal ethnic groups. Supporters or rhe Arusha Agreement main-
tain that they have brought together the majority of Burundi's 
representative elements around a basic text. However, other 
observers revile it as a "non-agreement" negotiated under 
duress, excluding the main rebel tactions, based on a balance 
of strength and leaving issues such as free elections, the can-
tonment of rebels and reform of the army un reso Keel. 
Despite a high level of pressure from the international 
community and signatures at the toot ot the document, the 
weapons did not fall silent. Meanwhile, negotiations contin-
ued under the leadership of South African Vice-President 
Jacob Zuma. In 2001 there was agreement on a three-year 
transitional government, whereby lutsi President Pierre 
Buyoya of rhe Union for National Progress (UPRC)NA) 
would hand over power, in mid-term, to the Hutu Vice-
President Domitien Ndavizeve, General Secretary of the 
Burundi Democratic Fronr (FRODEBU). Elections are due-
to be held after Mr Nadayizeve's term ends. The handover ol 
power took place without incident on 1 Mav 2003, although 
it was preceded by intensified military action on the pan ol 
the FDD and FNL. 
Ceasefire agreements - unfortunately regularly violated -
were signed in 2002 with three rebel groups. The Rwasa tac-
tion of the FNL, a non-signatory, does not consider itsell to 
be bound by these agreements. Furthermore, African Union 
forces, present in Burundi since late April 2003, have to do 
the best they can with a lack of resources and a mandate that 
leaves them little room for manoeuvre: they are restricted to 
monitoring the ceasefire and to the cantonment ol certain 
rebels. Out in the field, however, tension remains high, with 
constant interplay between rebel tactions and short-lived, 
apparently "unnatural" alliances between Hutu and Tutsi 
extremists, which brings further confusion to the crisis in 
Burundi. 
Chess, Great Lakes style 
The crisis, however, is not bound by Burundi's borders, 
and the country resembles a chess board over which other 
countries in the region move their pieces: former Rwandan 
Armed Forces (FAR) combatants and Interahamwe militias 
that took part in the 1994 Rwandan genocide have close-
links with Hutu rebels. They use the territory of Burundi 
(and ot Congo) as a base camp. Some Interahamwe tactions 
also took part in the |ulv 2003 attack on Bujumbura, and ι he-
presence of FDD rebels in the Democratic Republic til 
Congo assisted the Burundian army's incursion into Kivti 
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province. Furthermore, Hutu rebels are an integral part of 
the Congolese army. Uganda and Tanzania are only very 
moderately supporrive of South Africa's having taken on the 
mantle of regional leader, and although there is no formal 
proof of Tanzanian supporr for the Burundian rebels, the 
lack of border control between the two countries and the 
presence of rebels in refugee camps cannot be denied. 
The regional situation could hardly be more fluid, influ-
enced as it is by other countries' politics and with deeply 
interconnected areas ot unrest. A global solution to the civil 
war must therefore be based on a solid regional commitment 
- an essential condition, but far from being the only one, 
given that the internal causes of the crisis are still to be 
addressed. 
What conflict? 
More than an ethnic conflict, Burundi is witnessing the 
"ethnicisation" of a conflict. Hutus and Tutsis share the same 
language, the same religions, rhe same culture and the same 
historical references. Tutsis are no more confined to the cities 
than the Hutus to the country. Acknowledgemenr of an indi-
vidual's membership of a particular ethnic group is based 
more on his radical discourse than on simplistic evolutionary 
stereotypes. Furthermore, the army contains a number of 
Hutu military; leaders and parliamentarians from the 
UPRONA "Tutsi" party are Hutus, and so on. 
Neverrheless, an erhnic group-based ideology does indeed 
exist: rooted in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, it was 
then exploited, made more radical, taken to extremes and 
largely internalised by Burundians. Membership of one or 
another ethnic group ended up being imposed by the State as 
a means of management, to the profit of the ruling elite. The 
majority arguments of some and the security-oriented words 
of others were used as justification for all the atrocities, and 
led to the massacres of 1972 againsr Hums and 1993 against 
Tutsis. De facto impunity was established; indeed, some pro-
tagonists in the crisis are still involved in running the country. 
Again, through double-speak, the parties cancel one another 
out. No one faction has a monopoly on virtue: consequently, 
promoting the work of justice merely opens a breach in one's 
own ranks. Laws against genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity exist, but the conditions they require in 
order to be enforced currently render rhem inapplicable. 
The civil war, as well as the sanctions, caused a contraction of the economy 
and a worsening ot poverty: 38% of the children are effected by 
malnutrition and endemic diseases have increased by 200% since 1993. 
m£^¿j¿*&a^ 
A degree of ethnicisation can also be found in the Arusha 
process negotiated by ethnic "groups", who, among other 
things, established quotas for ethnic groups' involvement in 
governmenr. For that is where the core of the conflict lies -
everyone wants a piece of the cake, but the cake is small and 
the number of those invited to partake of it is closely moni-
tored. Nor is membership of a particular ethnic group suffi-
cient when it comes to sharing out: this is the point at which 
regionalism
 
2 and even clan membership become superim-
posed over ethnic divisions. 
As often happens, the first to suffer in this "politico-ethnic" 
crisis are the ordinary people who are, by turn, hostages, tar-
gets and shields. They were also the first victims of the sanc-
tions (1997-1999), which, in combination with the war, 
caused the country's economy to slump. Social services are 
practically non-existent, levels of school attendance and 
healthcare provision have fallen sharply, all sectors of the pop-
ulation live in wretched conditions and in certain rural areas 
bartering has supplanted the use of money. Hundreds of thou-
sands of vicrims of the crisis eke out their lives in makeshift vil-
lages, and currently Burundi is one of the world's five poorest 
countries, based on the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index. 
There appear to be two principal ways out of the crisis - one 
based on negotiating exclusively with moderates and the other 
on inclusion of all rebel factions in the peace process. 
Cooperarion can also make its own contribution by encourag-
ing economic development, monitoring the peace process (not 
perfect, perhaps, but perfectible) and relying on civil society to 
rise above division. Not all bridges have yet been burnt and 
there are still links between the two communities who alone 
are capable of reaching a genuine consensus in Burundi. ■ FL 
1. Bin nudi, like lUvanda. is inaile up ola Hutu majority (HS"») while'Husis amlTwas 
represent 14% and 1% of the population, respectively. 
2. Trom iy~l to 2<X)1, political, economic and militan' power was dominated by Tutsi 
groups originating from Bttruri province, which is where Presidents Miconibcro. 
Bagaza and Huyuya originated.Λ north/south divide is also pa-sent amongst the Hutus. 
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«Compliance with the Arusha 
Agreement is key to the 
re-establishment of trust in Burundi» 
Interview with Burundi's Vice-President, Alphonse Marie Kadege 
Burundi's transitional government was set up in November 2001 under the Arusha Agreement as part 
of efforts to end eight years of civil war. It provided for power to be shared between the Tutsi minority 
and the Hutu majority. The second transitional stage was the transfer of power from Pierre Buyoya to 
Domitien Ndayizeye, which took place on 30 April 2003. Domitien Ndayizeye, himself Vice-President 
under Pierre Buyoya, is currently assisted by a Tutsi Vice-President, Alphonse Marie Kadege, President 
of the Uprona (Union for National Progress). In certain matters, such as those relating to security, the 
Vice-President's signature is reguired in order to validate the President's decisions, which enables 
Uprona to have a say in important decisions. With a doctorate in international relations, Alphonse 
Marie Kadege became a Member of Parliament in 1993, is a former communications minister, and 
has been leader of Uprona since December 2002. 
Given the country's current difficult circumstances, 
how do you envisage your mandate? 
Burundi's principal challenges are the continuation of the 
war and violence inflicted on innocent populations by the 
CNDD-FDD (National Committee for the Defence of 
Democracy—Forces for the Defence of Democracy) and 
FNL (National Liberation Front) armed groups, and gen-
eralised poverty and destitution. 
To meet such challenges, the government has long opted 
for dialogue and negotiation. Unforrunately, the armed 
groups are being obstrucrive, and reject the peaceful route to 
settlement of the conflict. The CNDD-FDD, which agreed 
to negotiate, is systematically violating the ceasefire agree-
ment signed on 3 December 2002 - and it is doing so on a 
massive scale. Therefore, in an attempt to reduce the wide-
spread poverty and general wretchedness generated by the 
war, the government is pushing ahead with its efforts at 
mobilising both the population and the economic operators. 
It is also relying on action on the part of the international 
community, and has requested rhe release of larger amounts 
of the grants and credits promised for so many years. 
The handover of the presidency took place 
smoothly. Is this an indication that peace is in the 
offing? 
The rotation of power took place calmly and serenely, a 
positive step in the right direction and proof that the tran-
sitional government is fulfilling its obligations. 
Nevertheless, rotation of power is not by itself sufficient to 
restore peace; the major obstacle to the advent of peace is 
the rebels who have opted for war and violence. 
How much progress has been made in 
implementing the Arusha Agreement? 
The government is pressing ahead wirh applying the Arusha 
Agreement. Specifically, the transitional institutions have been 
established and the armed factions that have signed and applied 
the ceasefire agreement have been incorporated into the gov-
ernment. Reform of the administration and the judiciary is also 
well advanced. Parliament has 
already adopted a number of 
laws under the Agreement, 
such as those governing polit-
ical parties and cracking down 
on the crime of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against 
humanity. However, it is 
because of the armed groups 
that essential clauses in the 
Agreement cannot be fully 
implemented: for example, 
reform of the defence and 
security corps, the repatria-
tion of refugees and the re-
inregration of the many vic-
tims of the war actually inside Burundi, many of whom are 
still rotting in the camps. 
What is the status of negotiations with rebel 
factions that have not signed or do not comply 
with the agreements? 
In the «case of the CNDD-FDD, negotiations have finished. 
We are read}' to implement the ceasefire agreement, but they 
are refusing. In the case of the FNL, nothing has yet happened; 
as I said, because that particular movement is refusing to nego-
tiate and is still perpetrating acts of terrorism, looting and gen-
era] destruction. Our hopes lie wirh rhe region as a whole and 
the international community if we are to persuade- these two 
groups to come to terms. If not, they will have to be constrained 
through the application of sanctions established tinder the agree-
ment, which even the international community has endorsed. 
Do you envisage a global solution for Burundi 
without a global solution for the region, by which 
I mean one involving Burundi, Rwanda, DRC and 
Tanzania? 
There are countries in the region that are at peace; Tanzania, 
for example, and, although precarious, peace is a reality in 
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Burundi's history has been marked by cyclical 
ethnic conflicts. Thousands have been killed, 
displaced, or escaped the country. 
PLUS  JAMAIS «! 
À M 
Rwanda. Burundi, too, could be at peace once again if certain 
regional protagonists were to withdraw their support for the 
rebels and if the international community were to agree to 
exert effective pressure on armed factions and their supporters. 
It goes without saying that a global solution for Burundi 
would become a reality more quickly and more easily if rhe 
entire region could be pacified and were to collaborate. For 
the time being, however, terrorisr and genocidal forces are 
able to move around the region practically with impunity. 
Ihe Interahamwe are actively cooperating with the FNL 
and the CNDD-FDD. 
In the long term, how can trust and confidence 
within Burundi be restored? 
Respect for the Arusha Agreement is key to the re-
establishment of trust inside Burundi. Basically, the com-
promises achieved under this Agreement establish the princi-
ple of power-sharing and joint administration of the country 
through political and ethnic balance involving the two main 
ethnic groups, Hutus and Tutsis, and also the Batwa people. 
The electoral system will have to be designed to guarantee 
that balance. There is no other way to eliminate exclusion 
and to ensure that all sides are involved. This is the cost for 
reestablishing calm and trust and, ultimately, conditions that 
are conducive to stability. 
Still on the same subject, and also that of 
combating impunity, does Burundi envisage an 
amnesty or perhaps action on the part of the courts 
and tribunals? What is the state of play regarding 
reform of the justice system and the setting-up of 
an international committee of inquiry? 
Combating impunity is yet another facror rhat will help 
restore confidence-. In all groups there are still those who 
"Burundi's principal challenges are the 
continuation of the war and violence inflicted 
on Innocent populations..." 
would mount an attack on one ethnic group or another — 
an unjust approach that lets the true criminals off the hook. 
Thev exist in every camp, but will have to answer individ-
ually for their actions. Therefore, anyone guilty of murder 
must be tried and judged, and I naturally include those 
guilty of acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 
To offer an amnesty would be to leave the way open to a 
repeat of the tragedies that all Burundians never wish to see 
again. To implement punishment is to adopt an "educa-
tional" approach which is likely to put an end to murder 
and to promote respect of the right to life. 
Reform of the justice system is now largely under way via 
a review of a number of laws and the inclusion of all ethnic 
groups in the judicial system at different levels. 
We have applied to the UN Security Council for an 
international commission of inquiry and, during a recent 
visit, it renewed its pledge to appoint one. 
Do you feel that the decentralisation and 
devolution of power will encourage citizens to 
become more involved in politics? 
The Arusha Agreement makes provision for the setting-
up of community councils and for a degree of local auton-
omy. When the relevant clauses are implemented, the 
authorities will be better able to listen. The involvement of 
citizens in the appointment of the councils and the author-
ities will also increase their control. Neverrheless, poverty 
levels in most areas will restrict the consolidation of demo-
cratic progress of that type. Currently, a number of com-
munities are unable to pay their representatives' wages, so 
they will find it difficult to take a substantial role in devel-
opmenr efforts. The State will have to continue to pay out 
subsidies of greater or lesser amotines. 
Given the interim strategic framework, the issue 
of good governance has a high profile. 
What measures do you envisage to promote it? 
Good governance will mean greater involvement of citi-
zens in supervising the actions of public servants, the use of 
public funds and proper management of the common 
wealth. Burundi is a country where corruption and mis-
appropriation of funds have long been combated. But the 
war made such phenomena more deeply entrenched. 
Supervision and surveillance mechanisms will have to be 
consolidated, so ethical committees composed of citizens 
must be set up locally and at government level. Greater calls 
musr be made on the legal system to severely punish acts of 
corruption and embezzlement of public monies. 
What is your position regarding the organisation 
of elections during this transitional period? 
It is indeed our ambition to organise elections during this 
transitional period, and we will soon be embarking on an 
examination of the texts that govern elections, such as the 
electoral code and the post-transition constitution. 
The only factors that could delay the elections are a con-
tinuation of the war, ongoing and entrenched ethnic 
hatred, and political intolerance, of which the CNDD-
FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Party for the Liberation of 
the Hutu People-National Liberation Front) armed groups 
are guilty. ■ FL Stability must come first 
Peace, a prerequisite for Burundi's economic recovery 
The threat is always present. Given that there is no war economy, any eruption of violence is 
a new blow to Burundi's production economy and further tears apart its social fabric. Bled 
white from 1993 to 1999, the country's economy regained a degree of strength after the 
suspension of international sanctions (1999) and the conclusion of the Arusha Agreement 
(2000). The prospect of a return to peace encouraged donors to re-pledge funds, and the 
improving law and order situation promoted renewed positive growth. This tentative 
recovery, however, remains precarious, and further unrest would signal its collapse. 
The Combination of the civil war, a decline in growth, 
the fall in coffee prices, socioeconomic stagnation and the 
reduction in external financial assistance has intensified 
poverty and stifled the Burundian economy. That economy-
is based essentially on agriculture and stock rearing, wirh 
90 per cent of the rural population dependent on those two 
areas. Farming accounts for 50 per cent of the country's 
GDP. Decreases in production have resulted from the frag-
ile security situation, displacement of persons and the 
vagaries of the climate. In addition, the population explo-
sion and the division of land amongst family members has 
contributed to the increasingly small size of plots and degra-
dation of the environment. Extensive agriculture in Burundi 
is insufficient to fulfil food requirements. Consequently, 
periods when food is available are interspersed wirh periods 
of temporary filmine. Furthermore, access to credit is a 
pipedream as far as small producers are concerned. Interest 
rates are prohibitive, repayment terms inappropriate and the 
banking system non-existent in rural areas. In some regions 
of the country, "demonitarisation" is raking root, with bar-
tering replacing use of the Burundian franc. 
Cash crops lose their appeal 
Cash crops, principally coffee, rea and cotton, account for 
80 per cent of Burundi's export revenue, yet the drop in pro-
duction generated by the crisis, the fill in world prices and 
institutional management of various sectors ol the economy 
mean that these crops are not currently an attractive propo-
sition. In recent years, exports have been substantially erod-
ed, putting considerable strain on foreign currency reserves. 
Moreover, Burundi is still under-industrialised. The 
industrial sector suffers from a lack of human resources, 
under-financing and insufficienr research. A number ol 
food-processing companies do exist - Brasserie- Brarudi, lor 
example — but they are faced with the limited size ol the 
market and consumers' weak purchasing power. Rare ore 
deposits, which include gold, are currently being mined, 
and there is a possibility that Burundi's soil contains other 
resources, such as the nickel reserves close to the border 
with Tanzania. Burundi is, in fact, an extension ol the mor-
phological structure of the Congo, but, as yet, no official 
exploration has yielded viable results. 
Resumption of external aid 
The October 1993 crisis mortgaged the country's econo-
my that was then brought to its knees by the sanctions 
imposed in 1996 in the wake ol the military coup d'etat. 
Between 1993 and 1999, external aid melted away, decreas-
ing from €350 million to €50 million per year. I he peace-
negotiations and the conclusion ol the Arusha Agreement 
(August 2000) regenerated donors' commitments, those of 
the F,U included. Durin» a round-table meeting in Geneva 
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in 2002, donors committed to funds amounting to a 
global figure of US$905.7 million. Reactivation of multi-
lateral and bilateral aid and the progressive srabilisarion of 
the country have yielded a number of positive results. After 
negative growth in 1999 and 2000, GDP growth was back 
in the black, posting 2.1 per cenr in 2001 and 3.5 per cent 
in 2002. Also in 2002, inflation stabilised at 8 per cent as 
compared with 24.3 per cent in 2000 and 9.3 per cent in 
2001. Recently, the fiscal deficit has also been absorbed 
because of an increase in State revenue. Nevertheless, State 
fiscal policy is encountering opposition from a large part of 
the private sector rhat deems it counterproductive given 
that corporate taxation is so high. 
On the downside 
Less encouraging, however, are signs that military spend-
ing is to be revised upwards, notably to finance the canton-
ment of rebels as stipulated by the Arusha Agreement. The 
trade gap, ted by the collapse in exports and rise in imports, 
continues to widen. Foreign investment still stands at an 
extremely low level, and privatisation of public corporations 
(a condition of part of World Bank aid) are undersrandably 
delayed given the country's delicate political situation. For 
the time being, the government appears anxious to avoid any 
confrontation with the trade unions. Moreover, accelerated 
trade liberalisation within the context of COMESA 
(Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and the 
Regional Integration Facilitation Forum ' has not yet gener-
ated positive effects. Indeed, the tariff and non-tariff barrier-
related revenue loss has not been offset by a substantial 
increase in the volume of trade. In addition, Burundian com-
panies are srill largely geared towards import substitution. If 
a redirection of production is essential today, it will be even 
more so in the future since COMESA and the EU intend to 
negotiate an economic partnership agreement (EPA). 
lb cap it all, foreign debt - in excess of USS1.1 billion -
is literally unsustainable. The servicing ofthat foreign debt 
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Employment possibillties-fri the forma f sector. 
accounts for 80 per cent of the volume of exports in goods 
and services. Consequently, the EU has decided to directly 
wipe out part of the arrears due to be paid by Burundi to the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). On the initiative of the 
World Bank, a Multilateral Donor Trust Fund has also been 
set up to service part of the debt and pay back arrears. If it 
fulfils IMF (Inrernarional Monetary Fund) conditions, 
Burundi could also access debt relief via the Enhanced 
HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries') initiative, leading 
to a reducrion in its debt. 
Faced with such wide-ranging challenges, the government is 
committed, with donor assistance, to stabilising the economy, 
achieving growth of five per cent from 2004, reducing the fis-
cal deficit, containing inflation and instituting major structur-
al reforms, including privatisation and restructuring of State 
enterprises. Investment in infrastructure and social services is 
also on the cards. According to some observers, Burundi is 
capable of achieving growth in the region of five per cent by 
2004, although two obstacles may stand in the way of this: 
poor climatic conditions and a resumption of conflict. One 
natural, the other "merely human". ■ FL 
1. The objective of the RIFF is to integrate the economies of the Member States 
of the Forum by facilitating the cross-border flow of private investment, trade, 
payments, labour and capital.Λ number of eastern and southern African and 
Indian Ocean countries are members. 
Private sector 
Roses instead of rifles 
In an economic climate haunted by crisis, certain companies are resorting to innovative schemes. One such company, ATB 
(Agro Trading Business), specialises in the export of roses. It has come up trumps. ATB was able to invest partly on the basis 
of equity. When it started up, €1.5 million was injected, 60 per cent provided by the family owning the company and the 
other 40 per cent in the form of a loan from a regional bank. The company also benefited from the EBAS (the EU-ACP 
Business Assistance Scheme, financed under the EDF) programme, which provides technical assistance to the private sector 
by helping companies finance projects up to 50 per cent of service costs. In this case, EBAS contributed 50 per cent of the 
fees of the consultant who advised ATB during start-up. 
Set up in 1999, ATB produces three varieties of rose (Golden Gate, 
φ E¡^T~~^1 Sacha and Circus) on its three-hectare plantation. The production site 
^ ^ i W£ is five kilometres from the centre of the capital, Bujumbura, and has its 
^^r' ^^^^^ own irrigation system. The company employs 150 people -
T-' 80 per cent of whom are women - on glasshouse production and 
packaging activities. The flowers are air-freighted to the Amsterdam 
market three times a week, in consignments of 100,000 stems. 
The cut-flower market is highly competitive and ATB suffers from three 
handicaps: obtaining inputs, the high cost of freight and the problem 
of finding quality technical assistance. One solution advocated by 
Thierry Nzohaboayo, ATB's young director, is for a number of operators 
to be grouped together: "The market is wide open, and demand is 
always growing. If we could group together a number of producers 
and explore new avenues, cost-sharing would be feasible. We could 
also charter our own transport". 
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The State under the microscope 
The Observatory for Governmental Action (OAG), an independent civil society organisation, 
scrutinises the Burundian government's actions. Set up in 1999, but officially recognised two 
years later, the OAG is presided over by the Ligue Iteka, a human rights defence organisation 
that is active in both Burundi and the Great Lakes region. The OAG is composed of 18 
associations, six journalists and six parliamentarians. Its objective is to persuade Burundian 
leaders to be accountable for their actions and to encourage the people to require this of 
them. The OAG is attempting to increase citizens' participation in national affairs through 
studies, reports, enquiries, polls, awareness-raising campaigns and education. 
The OAG's President, Christophe Sebudandi, spoke to the Courier. 
Our work has an impact -
leaders are persuaded to 
be more transparent and 
to lift the veil of mystery 
surrounding their actions, 
whereas they used to 
think they had a free 
hand. 
You preside over an association set 
up by civil society. But does civil 
society really exist in Burundi? 
Indeed it does. It might still be weak, 
but it does exist, and there are some truly 
dynamic organisations that are doing a 
reasonable job. Yet it's rather on the gov-
ernment side that they are not recognised. 
The OAG's members include 
parliamentarians. Doesn't this risk 
getting in the way of an objective 
analysis of the government's actions? 
The parliamentarians who are mem-
bers of our association join as individu-
als. We are particularly interested in hav-
ing a link with parliament through the 
parliamentarians who are members of the 
OAG. The fact that they are in the 
minority safeguards us against any detri-
mental influence on their part: in fact, 
they put in the forefront the importance 
of ethics and their desire to make a com- ΗΗΜΜΙΗ 
mitment through the OAG. 
The OAG also aims to build parlia-
ment's institutional capacities: for example, we hope that 
actions that have been implemented will help to improve 
oral questions, and that through our reports such ques-
tions will be more wide-ranging and more searching. 
Incidentally, we've had a degree of success through our 
moniroring of certain bills. We have assisted members of 
parliament in their work on reports dealing with subjects 
such as corruption, for example. Reports are important, 
but we try to ensure that they are not just filed away 
somewhere, never to see the light of day. We've found that 
it's possible to work genuinely with these politicians and 
important role in contributing to greater social 
harmony, but also in pushing for positive changes in 
society. To be able to play this role, civil society 
leaders have to understand the place and the 
functions of civil society. But many grey areas 
surround the concept of civil society both on the
 
nar
t
 
of its members and of the public in gei 
to act as a watchdog to stop them going 
round in circles. 
How can governmental action be 
scrutinised when one has the 
impression that the government is 
still very weak? 
Yes, that is a problem. Unfortunately, 
the terms of our remit are somewhat 
vague. The target of our scrutiny is very 
difficult to discern, its outline really 
imprecise. I regret to say it, but the State 
is currenrlv in decay: making such an 
observation is also very much a pari ol 
our work. Paradoxically, representing 
civil socien' as we do, our desire is to be 
able to strengthen the State's authority by 
encouraging it to lollow up on its com-
mitments. I suppose what it amounts to 
is; "we have nothing better, so, as you arc-
all we have, try to improve". 
tmmmam^mmmt The OAG wants leaders to be 
accountable. Isn't that slightly 
unrealistic given the current 
weakness of the justice system? 
Ihe justice system is at the heart of State action. II ii 
is weak, the repercussions are felr in all sectors. 
Nevertheless, we have already seen the impact ol the 
: 
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action we have been able to 
implement. In education, for 
example, we really felt that 
leaders were obliged to explain 
themselves. Indirectly, we have 
contributed to Belgium releas-
ing funds lor teachers, and we 
have- made a direct contribu-
tion regarding the strikes 
organised in the education sec-
tor, thanks to a very high-pro-
file awareness-raising cam-
paign. In other areas, we've 
worked with the UK NGO 
International Alert. Our work 
with them genuinely had an 
impact — leaders were persuad-
ed m be more transparent and 
to lift the veil of mystery sur-
rounding their actions, where-
as they used to think they had 
a free hand. 
You mentioned the OAG's 
work regarding corruption. 
Is corruption not inevitable? 
Does it not, in a manner of 
speaking, encourage a 
redistribution of wealth to a 
certain extent? 
You have to make a distinc-
tion between small-scale and 
large-scale corruption. Both exist and borh restrict 
peoples rights and cause them to become even more 
impoverished. They reinforce inequalities by enabling 
certain people to have access ro more resources. For other 
people, there is a real problem of survival as condirions 
are extremely poor and wages ridiculously low. In cases 
like this, corruption simply helps make ends meet. 
We, however, perceive rhis as an attack on people's rights, 
because if you want any service from rhe Srate you have to 
pay for it. If you do not have the financial resources to do 
so, vou will be deprived of State services or will have to go 
through a great deal of red tape simply to enable them to 
relieve you of your money. If you do not pay, you get noth-
ing. 
This kind of corruption is rife. 1rs in every sector, and 
everyone contributes to the system. What is more, our 
government is composed of completely disparate groups, 
which means it is extremely difficult to achieve a common 
position on issues. As posts and appointments are, to all 
intents and purposes, temporary, everyone's first concern 
is to make what profit they can. Corruption here is like a 
cancer, yet the general attitude towards this issue is to play 
lor time. Yet, Burundi was not always in this position -
corruption used to be kept within limits. 
'fake the airport, for example, the country's main show-
case. Perhaps you want a Burundian driving licence? Well, 
hand me BIF 35,000 |€30]and you can have one. Or an 
international driving licence, maybe? Give me another 
BIF 15,000 [€12] and it's yours. That is how things are, 
and it is truly depressing. 
People need to be ¡nfor 
"It came to our notice that the population 
was not aware of the Arusha Agreement". 
One of the organisation's 
objectives is to increase 
citizens' - both male and 
female - involvement in 
managing the country. Are 
your actions sufficiently 
well-publicised among the 
population? Do they have 
enough impact? 
No. Wc- are currently put-
ting together a strategy to 
enable us to publicise our 
actions better. We have, for 
example, entered into a part-
nership with two radio sur-
dons. Our reports will be 
broadcast over the radio in 
Kirundi so that people can be 
made aware of them. 
Otherwise, as we deal with 
complex issues, our work is 
perhaps somewhat elitist. Yet 
that, too, is important, as the 
elite can pass information on. 
This does not mean that we 
have had a change of heart 
about the people being 
informed. For instance, it 
came to our norice that the 
population was not aware of 
the Arusha Agreement. 
On that very subject, could you give us your 
thoughts on the implementation of the Agreement? 
Someone once said: "An agreement is very difficult to 
implement - what chance is there in the case of a dis-
agreement?". As I see it, all the agreements were signed 
under duress. In the case of the Arusha Agreement, 
Nelson Mandela had to apply intense pressure and called 
on all the support he could muster worldwide, including 
from President Clinton, in order for rhe Agreement to be 
signed. The ceasefire agreement was also signed under 
duress. The protagonists have signed but they seem 
unwilling to comply. My feeling is that there are hidden 
agendas, things that people do not want to accept. 
Everyone has his or her own agenda. To be honest, I'm 
very pessimistic, but I hope I'll be proved wrong. 
I also believe that the culture of war remains pre-
dominant and that the army is still convinced that, 
given greater resources, it can beat the rebels. 
Unfortunately, this is a course that will inevitably pro-
long the war. The rebels, on the other hand, are con-
vinced that by weakening the State they can reap max-
imum benefit, even if they cannot quite take over 
power. My impression is that these agendas will contin-
ue to exist side by side. Then you have to factor in other 
countries' agendas - Burundi is not a case in isolation. 
There is manoeuvring on the part of Uganda, Tanzania, 
Congo and Rwanda, for example. We are in a kind of 
go-between system. ■ FL 
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Coffee's bitter side 
Large-scale campaign to combat disease and 
implement a major restructuring of the sector 
Burundi is living in a crisis situation - and its coffee sector is no exception. 
For the past three years, the fungal disease anthracnosis has led to a drastic drop in 
production and has undermined the quality of Burundian coffee. Already in crisis 
because of the rigid nature of its organisation and the fall in world prices, the coffee 
sector has no choice but to implement in-depth reforms. 
With Stabex*-funded support, a major campaign to combat anthracnosis is to be 
launched before the country embarks upon a major re-structuring of the sector: 
continued lessening of State influence, dismantling of trade barriers, privatisation and 
rehabilitation. 
Grown by 500,000 planters throughout practically 
the whole country on altitudes of between 1,250 and 
2,000m, arabica from Burundi is considered one of East 
Africa's best coffees. Globally, cash crops (coffee, tea, 
cotton) provide Burundi with 80 per cent of its export rev-
enue. Since independence in 1962, the State has adminis-
tered the coffee monopoly and kept many growers in this 
single export crop. The sector has inherited an organisation 
that is still rigid, despite State attempts at lessening its 
influence and allowing tentative steps towards privatisation. 
The sector's main protagonists are farmers, traders/hauliers, 
washing stations (joint ventures or private undertakings), 
hulling and packing companies (joint ventures and private 
undertakings), tax officials, the Burundi Coffee Office 
(OCIBU), exporrers and rhe relevant ministerial depart-
ments. Levels of influence- within the sector remain unbal-
anced, and reforms implemented in the early 1990s have 
proved insufficient. This has given rise to distortions and 
generated losses, bur is not the only reason lor the sector's 
current problems. 
A sector under threat 
Burundian coffee production has no influence on world 
prices, which are desperately low. Furthermore, the fixed 
price for coffee cherries has remained the same for a num-
ber of years, despite galloping inflation. Consequently, col-
fee growers have abandoned their plantations in favour ol 
more profitable crops. Foreign debr has forced the OCIBU 
Coffee grains drying 
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to raise taxes - thereby adversely affecting the sector's prof-
itability - and domestic debt levels have prevented the sub-
sidising of poor harvests. The picture is gloomier still if one 
takes into account that plantations are ageing, access to 
credit is too restricted, the producers' trade organisation is 
still in its infancy, and diseases such as anthracnosis have 
now taken hold. Production this year has fallen dramatical-
ly: in 2002 it was 36,000 tons, but in 2003 it is unlikely to 
exceed 12,000 tons. 
Long regarded as a benign disease in Burundi, anthrac-
nosis has in the past not been targeted with large-scale 
chemical treatment. However, the last three years have 
seen an upsurge in the prevalence of the disease, and the 
extent of crop damage is considerable, as is the growers' 
loss of income. The Stabex system, in parallel with its sup-
port for the State budget, infrastructures and food pro-
duction, and programmes in three major export sectors, is 
to finance a vast spraying campaign. From October 2003, 
850 tons of copper oxychloride (a copper-containing fun-
gicide) will be sprayed on crops in the regions most affect-
ed. The cost of the operarion will be €2,533.000; 95 per 
cent of this amount will be provided by Stabex. 
Restructuring 
Stabex funds have been used to conduct technical audits 
and studies, and the anti-anthracnosis campaign has been 
judged the main priority in order to re-establish the sec-
tor's profitability. Nevertheless, in pursuit of the policy of 
lessening State influence, a more global strategy of with-
drawal from rhe public sector, trade liberalisation, privati-
sation and rehabilitation is now advocated. This strategy is 
based notably on coffee growers being free to form organ-
isations at local, regional and national level. To ensure rep-
resentation at all levels in the sector, a consultation and 
regulation body could be set up. This combined trade 
council would in the future become the sector's decision-
making body. Another proposal is for the process of pri-
vatisation of State enterprises to make special provision for 
coffee growers and for economic operators to be able to 
become freely involved in the sector at any level. Finally, 
with a view to increasing exports, quality control and 
management must be above reproach. ■ FL 
• Stabex. the Kuropcan Commission's «export-stabilisation scheme (for agricultural 
produce) was set up under Lome 1 and lasted for more than twenty years, 
its purpose was to provide the ACP countries with the financial resources to fund 
their agricultural sectors when these experienced difficulties owing to reduced 
export earnings. I 'ndcr the Cotonou Agreement (June 2(100). the* Stabex scheme 
no longer exists as a separate instrument, but ACP countries can address fluctua-
tions in export earnings through the overall programming process. Burundi, how-
ever, is still able to receive Stabex funds that were not used between 1990 and 
1999. up to a global amount of €S6 million. 
Burundi-EU cooperation 
at a glance 
The Commission suspended cooperation with 
Burundi in January 1997, in line with international 
sanctions against the country from 1996 to 1999. 
Following the peace negotiations, EU-Burundi co-
operation has gradually been restored. The 
Commission provided, along with other donors, 
"enhanced humanitarian aid" through a €48 million 
programme (covering resettlement/reintegration of 
displaced people, actions in the area of justice and 
reconciliation, demobilisation programmes). 
Assistance under the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th EDFs 
represents a total of €400 million. 
Since 2000, cooperation has focused on: 
• agriculture and rural development; 
• infrastructures; 
• support for balance of payments and for stabilisa-
tion of public finance; 
• strengthening the institutional capacities of the 
State in the broad sense (Parliament, Justice, human 
rights, the peace process); 
• support for the return of refugees and the re-
integration of victims of the conflict 
For 2003-2007 (9th EDF), the EU has made available an 
overall amount of €172 million (A and Β envelopes). 
This will be used within the context of the "Temporary 
Strategic Context of economic growth and the fight 
against poverty" adopted by the Government and 
approved by the IMF and the World Bank in 2002. 
A first budget (the A budget) of €115 million is 
intended for: 
• rural development (€56,75 million); 
• good governance (€17,25 million); 
• Macro-economic support (€31.5 million); 
• Non-focal areas: capacity-building of civil society 
(€9.5 million): 
A second budget (the Β budget) of €57 million is avail-
able to cover unforeseen needs (such as emergency 
aid, debt alleviation, support for export earnings, when 
these cannot be financed out of the A budget). 
Burundi can also avail of the Investment Facility man-
aged by the European Investment Bank. 
Moreover, ECHO - the EU humanitarian aid office -
has been present in Burundi since 1996. 
For the period 2001-2002-2003, the sum allocated to 
ECHO is €52,2 million. 
For 2003, ECHO is focusing on: 
• Health (€4.9 million); 
• Nutrition (€2.6 million); 
• Food security and food aid (€2.9 million); 
• Water, sanitation, first aid, education (€3.5million); 
• Security, coordination and logistics (€1 million). 
The Centre Jeunes Kamenge (the Kamenge Young People's Centre) in 
Burundi, was featured in Courier n° 198, to mark the Right Livelihoood 
Award the Centre received "for their exemplary and indomitable 
courage and compassion, which have proved that, even after nine years 
of murderous civil war, young people from different ethnic groups can 
learn to live and build a future together in peace and harmony". The 
centre has pointed out to us that the number of girls who attend is 25% 
(and not 5% as cited in Courier n° 198), and they are also supported by 
French, Belgian, and Italian cooperation, as well as the European 
Commission and Austrian, Canadian and American partners. 
Θ 
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Burundi Rehabilitation Programme 
Bridging the gap between 
emergency aid and development 
Burundi has been plagued by conflict since 1993. Its economy has collapsed and its 
population held to ransom. Conflict has created a new "category" of citizen: victims. 
The displaced, refugees, former soldiers, and the wounded make up the greater part of 
Burundi's population. However, aid programmes are being re-established in Burundi, in 
step with peace negotiations. Against a difficult and extremely volatile backdrop, PREBU, 
the European Commission's Burundi Rehabilitation Programme, is now taking over 
responsibility for emergency aid and responding to people's demands. 
Zacfiarie, chairman of a farmers' association in Caruzi 
province in the north of Burundi, comments: "We had 
absolutely nothing left! Conflict and famine did so much 
damage in 1999 and 2000, and we had nothing to live on 
except World Food Programme aid. We were afraid to grow 
crops. When PREBU came onto the scene, the first thing 
that people here wanted was simply food security. After that, 
we asked for seed and livestock to sell on the market". 
First emergency aid, then rehabilitation. In theory, it 
looks simple. PREBU has been doing its utmost to link 
humanitarian aid and longer-term development since 2000. 
Endowed with a budget in the region of €68 million over 
five years and eight months, the programme focuses on 
helping victims of the conflict and rehabilitating the coun-
try's economic and social infrastructure. "The aim is not to 
build or to hand out seed just for the sake of it", says 
Juvenal Ntahomvukiye, head of PREBU's provincial branch 
in the north of the country. "We aim to improve everyone's 
standard of living - displaced persons, refugees, former sol-
diers and the poor. The objective is to reintegrate people 
into society in a sustainable way, to strengthen rural and 
urban communities and to relaunch income-generating 
activities". An ambitious programme. PREBU's activities 
range from the reconstruction and construction of schools 
and health facilities, water-supply points etc. to electrifica-
tion of rural areas, support for the democratic transition 
process, as well as support for existing associations. 
Two prerequisites: security and responding to demand 
When it started in 2000, PREBU focused on three "paci-
fied" provinces (Kirundo, Kayanza and Ngozi). As Cyriaque 
Baricako, PREBU's director, explains, "it's impossible to 
build for the long term in a region that is prey to conflict". 
Although most of PREBU's activities are concentrated in 
the safest areas, all Burundi's provinces currently benefit 
from its work, which is based on the involvement of the 
beneficiaries and the decentralisation of aid. Applications 
for assistance are lodged by the beneficiary communities to 
PREBU's regional representatives, who analyse them along 
with the community and provincial development commit-
tees. The beneficiaries also commit to making a contribu-
tion to the project by providing equipment or their labour. 
The provincial authorities, also, have to back the approach 
and support it. 
Rehabilitation and construction are the most "visible" aspects of the programme. 
Infi;  the  ible  of I  frastructures are the mosr visible aspect or the pro-
gramme. Rehabilitation and construction are occurring at 
such a rate that it is impossible to draw up a comprehensive 
lisr, bur work includes parhs, roads, bridges, schools, banks, 
health centres, hospitals, markets, business centres, tile 
kilns, metal or tiled roofs, camps for displaced persons, elec-
trical supply lines, water-supply points, pumping stations, 
and so on - with all the work carried out by local business-
es selected on the basis of tenders. In addition to the direct 
advantages for everyone concerned, highly labour-intensive 
work is helping to relaunch the regional job market and the 
economy of the region concerned. 
Generating income 
Less visible, but no less crucial, is the relaunching of 
income-generating activities. Aside from the work provided 
by infrastructure projects, PREBU also focuses on farming, 
stock rearing, fish farming, plant production for fruit and 
forests, increasing stocks of seed, reforestation, anti-erosion 
measures, production of tiles for damaged houses etc. The 
programme almost exclusively supporrs pre-existing associ-
ations that have proved their viability. "We have to avoid a 
situation where associarions are ¡ust created for the 
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Conflict has created a new "category" of citizen: victims; the displaced, refugees, 
former soldiers, and the wounded make up the greater part of Burundi's 
population. 
circumstances", stresses Sylvie Niyondiko, organiser in 
Ngo/.i province. PRF.BU also operates a system of rolling 
loans; in the case ol stock rearing, this would consist ot 
removing some of the new-born animals in order to hand 
them on to other beneficiaries, particularly the most in 
need, thereby generating a multiplier effect. 
Is PRKBU merely an idyll amidst devastation? Not at all. 
Like any programme-, it is faced with problems of size: 
whether tor infrastructure or support for associations, 
demand is such that the monitoring and supervision that 
are essential if the programme is to continue pose a chal-
lenge. A hospital, even when brand new, cannot function 
without docrors; nor a school without teachers; nor a water 
post without a tap. Stich cases may be exceptions, but they 
do occur. Can this be put down to a lack of staff? Or to too 
little involvement on the part ot the authorities? Insufficient 
awareness-raising? Incomplcrc ownership by the popula-
tion? Or to people taking insufficient advantage ot past 
achievements? Or to rivalry between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries? The answer is undoubtedly a mixture of all 
these, to varying degrees depending on the problems 
encountered. In addition, ir is difficult to coordinate the 
various aid programmes on account of the- multiplicity of 
people involved and of the procedures applicable to each 
programme. Although its level of success and budget are the 
envy of many, account still has to be taken of PREBU's 
wide-ranging mission and of Burundi's ongoing crisis. 
What of the future? II the situation permits, Prebu would 
like to complete the essential rehabilitation work requested 
by rhe population and to conrinue supporting the agricul-
tural associations in order to encourage rural development. 
Because, despite the resumption ol aid to Burundi, the rural 
popularion remains impoverished. According to estimates, 
its buying power has decreased fivefold since 1993 for the 
least deprived (tradesmen, craftsmen, etc.). This is virtually 
zero for the majority of families. Moreover, the dispersal of 
the population does not make economic development easy. 
Consequently, strengthening rural urbanisation by encour-
aging people to settle around community infrastructures 
(primary school, college, health and trade centres, coopera-
tives...) seems an essential element in reviving the rural 
economy and ensuring security. Structuring rural society 
around medium-sized villages (5,000 to 10,000 inhabi-
tants), makes it possible to organise harvests and storage, to 
better manage supplies of inputs and small agricultural 
equipment to farmers and to encourage the creation of 
small businesses and trade. Lastly, Prebu would like to be 
able to continue investing in the remonetarisation of rhe 
rural environment so that the food sector can fully play its 
adjustment role in the general economic context of the 
country. Financing general interest activities - like rehabili-
tating rural tracks which are highly manpower intensive, 
trade cenrres and any activities which open up rural areas -
makes it possible to inject money into the most disadvan-
taged areas and to initiate the remonetarisation which is 
essenrial ro development. ■ FL 
Less visible, but also crucial, is PREBU's emphasis on income-generating activities, 
such as farming and stock-rearing. 
Evaluation at 30 June 
Work realised 
Primary schools 
Health centres 
Hospitals 
Provincial health offices 
Business centres 
Kms of water supply lines 
Kms of rural electrification 
Kms of rural roads 
Houses 
Supported associations 
Forest plants produced 
Hectares of forest planted 
N° 
71 
12 
5 
3 
5 
455 
14 
42 
2.500 
380 
12.500.000 
6.000 
2003 
N°of 
beneficiaries 
350.000 
100.000 
100.000 
50.000 
100.000 
10.000 
10.000 
15.000 
38.000 
12.500 
Remarks 
Over six years 
+300 (by 09.2005) 
+102 kms (by 09.2005) 
+150 kms to be 
achieved (through 
Stabex, for which the 
technical dossier 
is managed by Prebu) 
Each association 
has on average 
20 members 
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General Information 
Area (square km): 
Population (million) : 
Population density: 
Capital : 
Provinces : 
Languages: 
Ethnic groups: 
Religions: 
Political structure 
Official name: 
President (since 30 April 2003): 
Current Vice-President: 
Legal system: 
Legislative branch: 
Political parties: 
Economy 
Currency: 
GDP per capita: 
GDP growth rate: 
Inflation rate: 
Principal economic sectors: 
Social Indicators 
Human development Index rating: 
Population growth rate: 
Life expectancy at birth: 
Infant mortality per 1,000 births: 
Gini index: 
Income poverty: 
Adult literacy rates: 
Population using improved 
water sources: 
1=
1 Kampala 
1Ã3 
Kigali 
'£< i 
•Bujumbura 
BURUNDI 
TANZANIA 
,  x\ 
26 338 km' 
6.8 (2002 est.) 
258 inhabitants per km
2 
Bujumbura 
Bubanza, Bujumbura, Bururi, Cankuzo, Cibitoke, Gitega, Karuzi, Kayanza, Kirundo, 
Makamba, Muramvya, Muyinga, Mwaro, Ngozi, Rutana, Ruyigi 
French (official), Kirundi (official), Swahili 
Hutus 85%, Tutsis 14%, Twa 1 % 
Christian (67%), Roman Catholic (62%), Protestant ( 5%), Muslim (10%) and 
traditional beliefs (23%) 
Republic of Burundi 
Domitien Ndayizeye (head of state) 
In accordance with the Arusha Agreement of August 2000, the Tutsi President 
Pierre Buyoya handed over power on 30 April 2003 to the Hutu Vice-President 
Domitien Ndayizeye (member of Burundi's principal Hutu political party, 
the Burundi Democratic Front [FRODEBU]). 
Alphonse Marie Kadege (Tutsi), President of the Union For National Progress 
(UPRONA). 
Based on the Belgian civil code, the Transitional Constitution approved in June 
1998, and on the Arusha Agreement. 
A National Assembly constituted in January 2002 and composed of 178 members, 
121 of which originate from the former Assembly. There is also a Senate, 
members of which are appointed on the basis of criteria stipulated under the 
peace agreement. 
Burundi Democratic Front (FRODEBU), Union For National Progress (UPRONA) 
Burundi franc (BIF) (€1 = 1,185.99BIF) 
Purchasing power parity US$690 (2001) 
3.5% 
8% 
agriculture; coffee, tea, cotton 
0.337 (171st out of 175 countries) 
2.36% (2002 est.) 
40.4(2001 est.) 
114 
33.3 (1998) 
46.3% 
49.2% (2001 est.) 
78% 
Sources: Economic Intelligence Unit 2003, UNDP (2003), CIA World Fact Book 
n° 199 july-august 2003 the Courier ACP-EU f 47 j etters to the edito 
Dear Madam, 
The Courier of January-February 2003 Φ-38) had a boxed 
article entitled "Mining the Poor". It repeated the sort of things 
that people from the rich world (who are perhaps feeling rather 
guilty about the demands their lifestyle puts upon nature) 
expect to hear about mining. Yet almost all of the "facts" offered 
are wrong. This Is doubly sad; there are some aspects of mining 
that need to be challenged, but none of them appear here. 
"Mining Is the world's fifth largest Industry, It Is also, by its very 
nature, one of the most environmentally destructive"says the 
author In 2000, the combined mining companies of the world had 
a capitalisation of about US$220 billion. That was under half that 
of Microsoft's US$550 billion dollars at the time. Even AOL/Time 
Warner had a capitalisation a third bigger than the world's 
mining Industry. But Microsoft andAOL/Tlme Warner don't put 
their shareholder's money at risk In the poor countries of the 
world; the mining companies do. Never a good deed goes 
unpunished;for the last 25 years the rate of return on mining has 
been below the cost of capital. 
The author says the mining sector Is "one of the most 
environmentally destructive". The area of the earth affected by 
mining Is very small In relation to Its size (there are only about 
40 significant operating mines In the whole of Africa between 
the Sahara desert and the Zambesi river). Rio Tinto PLC, one of 
the worlds biggest mining groups, says that If s operations 
affected 102,000 hectares in 2000. It has a capitalisation of 
around US$24 billion, or about a tenth of the sector's total, so at 
a first approximation one can say that the area affected by 
mining on this planet must be of the order of a million hectares. 
By contrast, the US has about 16 million hectares under roads or 
as parking lots. 
"TNC's have Increasingly moved to the Southern Hemisphere 
where... the environmental standards that are expected of the 
companies in the North do not apply In most of the South". First, 
public companies, no matter how small, fear weakening their 
share price by accusations of environmental abuse, so they 
maintain standards equivalent to, say, Australia's. In addition, 
the great majority of poor countries In the South have adopted 
rich-country style environmental codes provided by aid donors 
(many of which are actually Inappropriate, but never mind). 
Finally, the Southern Hemisphere is relatively unexplored, and 
that Is where most of the new mines are being found and 
started. 
"During the last hundred years, mining has meant that probably 
100 million people... have been removed from land where they 
lived and farmed." I don't know what the global figure is, but let 
us extrapolate from Zimbabwe's experience. In the past twenty 
years I can bring to mind only two significant cases of groups 
being displaced, one a gold mine (about 85 families) and one a 
diamond mine (about 140 families). Both were well 
compensated, given homes and farms greatly superior to those 
they left. In case I have missed some, let us assume that the total 
is 2,000 persons in the past 20 years, or 100 a year The value of 
Zimbabwe's mining output (when things are going well, which, 
as you will probably be aware, they are not) Is about US$500 
million anniutlly The value of the global output from mining is 
around US$200 billion a year, or about 400 times as much. Four 
hundred times a hundred Is 40,000 people a year, still too many, 
but hardly a million. 
There are a number of areas in mining where informed 
criticism could be very constructive. However; the type of 
scattergun approach, with bmad accusations such as the author 
has used, simply reinforces the conviction of the mining 
companies that they are dealing ivith ignorant riders of the 
environmental bandwagon who don't want to be get down off It 
to deal with the facts. 
Yours sincerely 
John Hollaway 
Dear Madam, 
Thank you for the most interesting issue n° 196 of the Courier In 
particular, I am Interested In the industrialisation processes adopted by 
developing countries. 
However, the article on pp. 3638 "Transnational corporations and 
developing countries: big business, poor peoples" introduces partial 
truths, without discussing enough the roles and responsibilities of 
receiving country governments. I expected a more analytical approach, 
of both the problems and advantages related to FDI flows to the 
developing world. Development Increasingly depends on achievements 
via FDI and international development grants and loans are more 
directed for institution building, inclusive of promoting and 
demobilising the FDI. This is healthy, an important aspect of the 
development trajectory and enables sustainability In the long term. 
The mineral Industryas a pioneer for industrial development and a 
means of"Resource-Based Sustainable Development" has very much 
changed its behaviour in the past ten years. In today's minerals sector, 
it is mainly the TNCs which have the technology and capital to develop 
nationally important resources and there are a number of cases where 
companies have faMy fulfilled even ambitious expectations of the 
society. The experience of many minerals-driven developing countries 
has shown that the "guilty TNCs" in this sector perform socially, 
environmentally and economically better than many ex-parastatals, 
which badly failed in all performance, or than many SMEs, which may 
act in a shortsighted way. By law, underground resources are 
worldwide a national resource, a unique opportunity for poverty 
reduction, and enterprises are awarded licenses (with negotiated terms 
and conditions) to develop this asset. Development cooperation 
agencies have an important opportunity and responsibility to 
encourage and advise governments to fully benefit from their 
minerals, avoid negative impacts, manage closures of mines, etc. 
Could some space in a future issue of the Courier be saved to analyse 
the possibilities for mining investments in the developing world and 
also the requirements for governments to properly accommodate to 
these investments? Whatever we would consider more ideal, the use of 
national resources has often been and will be the first step to 
industrialisation and certainly this can be done successfully. 
™ Pentti Noras 
Assistant Director, Geological Survey of Finland (GTK) 
NB The contents of this letter do not necessarily refect the views of the GTK 
γ raving read the article, "Regional Integration and development: the 
JLI challenges facing SADC", In the March-April 2003 edition of the 
Courier, I am writing to enquire about the possibility of more articles 
about regional integration in Africa. Given the number of regional 
groupings in Africa, your article Is well placed to highlight the strength of 
this organisation. I am uniting specifically with respect to the West Africa 
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). The coastal countries - Benin, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Togo - and the interior 
countries - Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger -forged their destiny together in 
founding the UEMOA in 1996. Partly Inspired by the EU, UEMQA has set 
itself similar goals of forging a large trading bloc to enhance the 
commercial competitiveness of its region Since the signing of the UEMOA 
Treaty, this sub-regional organisation has achieved tremendous 
advancements in regional integration and development. 
UEMOA has created a free-trade zone among members by guaranteeing 
free movement of goods, services, people and capital The Common 
External Tariff, in effect since 2000, and the common currency, the CFA 
franc-indexed on the Euro, all represent major achievements in the 
promotion of a dynamic investment environment. UEMOA is a formidable 
tool exacting coordinated national planning to achieve regional cohesion. 
The Union has drafted common sector policies in all areas of economic 
and social development with the goal of establishing a balanced approach 
to national and regional planning within the community. Common sector 
policies have been Implemented, such as the Common Industrial Policy 
(1999), the Common Mining Policy (2000) and the Common Agricultural 
Policy (200'l).And finally, harmonisation concerning competition is 
scheduled for 2003. These are no small achievements, and I hope that a 
forum in the Courier will allow more of your readers to learn about what 
is being accomplished toddy in West Africa. Moreover, the strong ties that 
exist between the EU and the UEMQA are today becoming even closer 
Katerina Sukovski 
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Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Fr-ance 
Territorial collectivities 
Mayotte 
St Pierre and Miquelon 
Overseas territories 
New Caledonia 
and dependencies 
French Polynesia 
French Southern and Antarctic 
territories 
Wallis and Futuna islands 
Netherlands 
Overseas countries 
Netherlands Antilles: 
Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin, 
Saba, St Fustachc 
Aruba 
Denmark 
Country having special 
relations with Denmark 
Greenland 
United Kingdom 
Overseas countries and territories 
Anguilla 
British Antarctic Territory 
British Indian Ocean Territory 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Falkland Islands 
Southern Sandwich Islands 
and dependencies 
Montserrat 
Pitcairn Island 
St Helena and dependencies 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
Pa  au 
fedor 
«r 
M  ero 
Manhall biands 
netta 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Cook Islands 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Cuba* 
Democratic Rep 
Djibouti 
Republic 
ublic of Congo 
Cuba was admitted as a new member o 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
East Timor 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
the ACP group in December 20C 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Marshall islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Micronesia 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Niue 
Pal au 
Papua New Guinea 
Rwanda 
St Kitts and Nevis 
St Lucìa 
St Vincent and the Grenadines 
Samoa 
São Tomé and Princip 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Vanuatu 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
General Secretariat of the ACP Group of States« Ave 
This list «iocs not prejudice the status of «hese coumric 
lue Georges Henri 451. 1200 Brussels, Belgium. Tel. 
and territories noss- or in the future. The Courier use 
signatory of the Coconou Agreement. East Timot was admitted in May 2003. 
phone: »32 2 743 0600 
s maps from a sarier)' of sources, «"heir use does nut imply recognition of any particular boundar 
Corrigendum 
In our article on the Natali Prize 
(published in the Courier N°169 
of January February 2003), a cer-
tain confusion could have been 
introduced as to the resignation 
of the Swedish Minister Maj-
Inger Klingvall. We take this 
occasion to specify that Mr 
Archer's articles did not lead to 
the Minister's resignation. Mrs 
Klingvall left her post in Spring 
2002 for unrelated reasons. 
I prejudice «he status of any state or territory. Published by the Directorate General for Development, 
European Commission, 
B-1049 Brussels 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/ 
publications_courier_en.htm 
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